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REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART II:  
NON-HOMICIDE CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON 
 




This is the second in a series of articles advocating for change to the 
Mississippi criminal laws.  The first article explained why change is 
needed.1  Briefly, our criminal laws have been justifiably criticized.2  Some 
of the shortcomings of the Mississippi law include sentencing disparity,3 
enabling defendants who have engaged in the same criminal conduct to 
have widely disparate sentences.  In addition, the Mississippi criminal laws 
often have vague definitions of the conduct prohibited,4 as well as 
confusing or absent definitions of states of mind required to commit the 
crime.  The hallmark of a fair criminal justice system is that whatever is 
forbidden is clearly defined in the criminal code.  Finally, the criminal 
statutes are disorganized and do not relate to each other.5  
 The Mississippi Judicial Advisory Committee, established in 1993 
by the legislature to improve the administration of justice,6 appointed the 
Criminal Code Consulting Group (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Committee”) to suggest revisions to the penal code.  The Committee has 
been meeting since 1996 and is finally reaching the end of its charge and 
 
   * Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. I want to thank all my 
research assistants who have provided valuable support over the years to me and to the 
Committee, especially my current research assistants Benjiman Blakely and Taylor 
Pilger. 
    1. Judith J. Johnson, Why Mississippi Should Reform Its Penal Code, 37 MISS. 
C. L.REV. 107 (2019).   
    2. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, and Usman Mohammed, The Five 
Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.3 
(2000) ranked the Mississippi Criminal Code as being the fifty-second worst criminal 
code in the U.S. The study included the federal code and the D.C. code in their 
assessments. Id. 
    3. Many criminal statutes in Mississippi provide a range of decades as a 
possible sentence, such as one year to thirty years. See Johnson, supra note 2, discussion 
accompanying notes 60-63. 
    4. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 67-72. 
    5. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 72-76. 
    6. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-21-1 (1993 Cumulative Supplement). The Judicial 
Advisory Study Committee was eliminated in 2018. H.B. 949 (2018).  The Criminal 
Code Consulting Group (the Committee) is now operating under the auspices of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court. 
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will present its proposals to the legislature in the foreseeable future.  This 
Committee, which I have chaired for more than twenty years, is 
recommending a comprehensive change to the laws to alleviate some of the 
problems with the current code.  The Committee proposals will improve the 
administration of the criminal justice system by providing clear definitions 
of the conduct prohibited and the states of mind required for the crimes, 
which will also be clearly defined.7  
This second in a series of articles continues to present the case for 
penal code reform.  The purpose of these articles is to explain the 
Committee’s reasoning and the proposed changes to the law.  This series of 
articles is intended to replace comments, which the Committee did not 
write, although there are extensive comments to the Model Code Penal, on 
which these proposals are based.  
The first article introduced and explained the Committee’s process.8  
In addition, the first article explained two important substantive areas of 
change: states of mind and homicide.9  This article addresses the most 
serious crimes against the person, other than homicide, and explains the 
Committee’s recommendations regarding assault and battery and related 
crimes, kidnapping and related crimes, and sex crimes.10  Future articles 
will explain the other groups of crimes and other issues that the Committee 
has addressed. 
Section II of this article briefly reviews the methodology of the 
Committee’s work; Section III explains the proposed changes to assault and 
battery and related offenses; Section IV explains the proposed changes to 
kidnapping and related offenses; Section V explains the proposed changes 
to sex crimes; and Section VI concludes.  
 
II. COMMITTEE METHODOLOGY AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
 
 As described more fully in the first article,11 the Committee has been 
meeting since 1996 and consists of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
legislative drafters, and law professors.12   The Committee has reviewed the 
 
    7. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V.1.  
    8. Id. at II. 
    9. Id. at V.1.  
  10. Robbery, which is also a serious crime against the person, will be discussed 
in the next article, along with arson and burglary.  
  11. See Johnson, supra note 2, at II.  
  12. Current committee members: Professor Judith J. Johnson, chair, Professor 
Matthew Steffey, reporter, Judge Donna Barnes, Patrick Beasley, Judge John Emfinger, 
Greta Harris, Caryn Quilter, Professor Ronald J. Ryclak, Kathy Sones, Alison Steiner, Ed 
Snyder, and Gwynetta Tatum. 
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most important parts of Title 97 of Mississippi Code of 1972, which 
contains the principal criminal statutes, working to develop a penal code 
that is more coherent and comprehensive than current law.13   
As explained in more detail in the first article,14 at each monthly 
meeting, we compare the Mississippi law to the relevant provisions of the 
Model Penal Code (hereinafter “Model Code”), as well as to the laws of 
other states.15  We then propose changes to the Mississippi law to reflect 
the needs of the state and the need for uniformity, both in the state code and 
among the codes of other states.  The Committee is currently reviewing all 
the proposed changes it has adopted in preparation for compiling the results 
for presentation to the Mississippi Legislature for its consideration.16  
The Committee based the proposed revisions on the Model Code, 
which virtually all states that have reformed their penal codes have 
 
Original Committee Members: Professor Judith Johnson, chair, Professor Matthew 
Steffey, reporter, Judge Fred Banks, co-chair for some period of time, Judge Robert 
Gibbs, who also co-chaired for some period of time, Judge Robert Bailey, James Craig, 
Judge Bobby DeLaughter, Rusty Fortenberry, Tom Fortner, Buddy McDonald, Rob 
McDuff, Bilbo Mitchell, Al Moreton, Professor Ronald J. Rychak, Ed Snyder, Kathy 
Sones, Judge Leslie Southwick, Frank Trapp, Senator Bennie Turner, Judge Frank 
Vollor, Professor Carol West, and Amy Whitten. 
 
Others who have served on the Committee: Dewitt Allred, Judge George Carlson, Judge 
Virginia Carlton, Judge Kay Cobb, Andre DeGruy, Judge Oliver Diaz, David Dykes, 
Chris Klotz, Katie Lawrence, Frank McWilliams, Margarette Meeks, Faye Peterson, 
Clarence J. Richardson, Judge Larry Roberts, Judge Keith Starrett, Robert Taylor, 
Shondra Taylor-Legget, and Philip Weinberg. 
 
Others who attended to help with specific issues: Drs. Phillip Meredith and Reb 
McMichael, Professor Cecile Edwards, Judge John Hudson, and Dean Emeritus Jim 
Rosenblatt. Judge Tom Broome also provided valuable input. 
  13. The Committee has been meeting in Jackson at the Mississippi College 
School of Law. The law school has furnished the meeting space and paid the research 
assistant. In addition, the law school also furnished lunch for the committee for several 
years under the leadership of Dean Jim Rosenblatt. We are very grateful for the support 
of the law school during all these years. The Administrative Office of the Courts has also 
furnished valuable support to the committee by sending out meeting notices and 
providing lunch for the committee for several years. 
  14. See Johnson, supra note 2, at II. 
  15. See, e.g. infra note 275. 
  16. The references to the minutes throughout usually reflect the Committee’s 
most recent review of the statute, although the Committee may have originally adopted 
the statute much earlier.  
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referenced.17  The Model Code, discussed more fully in the first article,18 
serves as a measure of uniformity among the several codes.  Two thirds of 
the states have reformed their penal codes and used the Model Code as the 
basis for their reforms.19  Thus, although Mississippi comes late to the 
process, it may draw from the experience of many other states that have 
reformed their penal codes.20  
In addition to establishing some uniformity among criminal codes 
and crimes, virtually all American law students are introduced to the Model 
Code and its version of general definitions, as well as many of its crimes 
and defenses.21  Also, courts and commentators frequently cite the Model 
Code as persuasive authority.22  Finally, the drafters wrote extensive 
comments, explaining the provisions of the Model Code in detail.  Although 
the comments will not be part of the legislation, lawyers, judges, and courts 
often rely on the comments to interpret the Model Code provisions.23 
As noted, the Committee chose not to publish separate comments, 
other than this series of articles, but to rely instead on the Model Code 
comments where appropriate.  This series of articles will serve to some 
extent as comments, and the Committee approves each article before 
publication. 
 
  17. Gerald E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The 
Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 297 (1998).  
  The Model Code is among the most successful academic law reform projects 
ever attempted. In the first two decades after its completion in 1962, more than two thirds 
of the states undertook to enact new codifications of their criminal law, and virtually all 
of those used the Model Penal Code as a starting point. Id. The Model Code was 
developed by the American Law Institute and published in 1961 as a model for states to 
reform their penal codes, which most states have done. See Gerald E. Lynch, Revising 
the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 297 (2003). The 
American Law Institute (hereinafter “ALI”) was organized in 1923 to improve and 
clarify the law. It consists of distinguished lawyers, judges, and professors. Herbert 
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 
COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968). 
  The American Law Institute is in the process of making some changes to the 
Model Code, notably in the area of sex crimes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE  Proposed 
§§ 213.0-213.11 (A.L.I. 2015). The original draft of sex crimes was considered outdated 
and unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 
supra at 230-31. The Committee also had to completely redraft the sex crimes sections, 
which will be discussed infra. The core provisions of the Model Code, however, have 
stood the test of time and there would be little to gain from changing them. See Lynch, 
Towards a Model Penal Code, at 297. 
  18. See Johnson, supra note 2, at III.  
  19. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, supra, note at 297.  
  20. Id. at 297-98. 
  21. Id.  
  22. Id.  
  23. Id. 
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The Model Code divides crimes by seriousness and punishes them 
accordingly.  The Model Code recognizes three degrees of felonies,24 which 
the Committee expanded to four degrees.25  Thus, murder is a felony in the 
first degree,26 along with aggravated forms of rape,27 robbery,28 and 
kidnapping.29  Manslaughter is a felony in the second degree,30 along with 
non-aggravated forms of rape,31 robbery,32 kidnapping,33 and others.  
Negligent homicide is a felony in the third degree,34 along with non-
aggravated burglary, and crimes of similar seriousness.35  The more serious 
theft crimes were classified as felonies in the fourth degree,36 along with 
others.37  
 
  24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  25. Section 6.01. Minutes of the Consulting Grp. on Mississippi Criminal Code 
Revision, (September 12, 2014) (hereinafter cited as “Minutes”) (on file with the author). 
The Minutes are unpublished but may be accessed by applying to the author. 
The proposed sentencing scheme for felonies is as follows:  
§ 6.06. Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced 
to imprisonment, as follows: 
(a) in the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term the 
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than 
twenty one year nor more than ten years, and the maximum of 
which shall be life imprisonment; 
(b) in the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term the 
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than 
ten one year nor more than three years, and the maximum of 
which shall be ten twenty years; 
(c) in the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term the 
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than 
1 year, at not less than one year nor more than two years, and 
the maximum of which shall be five ten years; 
(d) in the case of a felony of the fourth degree, for a term the 
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court, and the 
maximum of which shall be five years. 
  26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  27. Id. at § 213.1(1). 
  28. Id. at § 222.1(2). 
  29. Id. at § 212.1. 
  30. Id. at § 210.3(2). 
  31. Id. at § 213.1(1). 
  32. Id. at § 222.1(2). 
  33. Id. at § 213.1(1). 
  34. Id. at § 210 (2). 
  35. Id. at § 221.1(2). 
  36. Minutes, supra note 26 (September 12, 2012). 
 37. See, e.g., less serious forms of Criminal Mischief (Minutes, supra note 26 
(December 2018)) and Obstruction (Minutes, supra note 26 (August 2019)); as well as 
crimes such as Criminal Trespass, (Minutes, supra note 26 (September 2018)), Public 
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The Model Code recognizes misdemeanors but does not divide 
them according to seriousness.38  The Committee disagreed with this and 
divided misdemeanors into four classes, A through D.39  Finally, the Model 
Code classifies regulatory offenses as violations,40 which are not considered 
true crimes and, thus, not criminal.41  The Committee adopted the violation 
category.42 
As noted, the first article discussed mens rea and the most serious 
crimes against the person, the homicide crimes.43  This article will continue 
with the other crimes against the person: assault and battery and related 
crimes, kidnapping and related offenses, and sex crimes.  
 First, I want to explain how I dealt with statutes in this article. If the 
statute is relatively short, I put it in the text.  If the statute is discussed fully 
in the text, but is too long to put in the text, I put the statute in the footnotes 
to avoid distracting the reader.  Statutes that are long and not necessary to 
understanding the text were added to the appendix.  We used basically the 
same numbers as the Model Code, even if we did not base the statute on the 
Model Code.  I am distinguishing the sections that were not based on the 
Model Code by simply designating those with sections numbers.  If I am 
referring to the original version of the Model Code, I designated it as the 
original version Model Code.44  I otherwise noted changes from the Model 
Code with underlining and underlined strikeouts.  If we used the Mississippi 
statute as the basis for the proposed statute, I indicated changes from the 
Mississippi statute with italics and italicized strikeouts.  I also drew 
extensively on the Model Code comments, since these comments are very 
helpful in understanding the rationale of the proposed statutes, especially 
 
Drunkenness (Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2012)), and Disorderly Conduct (Minutes, 
supra note 26 (March 2012)).  
  38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.08 (AM LAW INST. 1985). 
  39. See Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2012); (September 2014). The 
sentencing scheme for misdemeanors and violations is as follows: 
§ 6.08 
(a) Sentences of misdemeanors shall be a definite term of imprisonment in the county jail 
or to hard labor for the county, within the following limitations: 
(1) For a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year. 
(2) For a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months. 
(3) For a Class C misdemeanor, not more than three months. 
(4) For a Class D misdemeanor, not more than one month. 
(b) A violation is punished by a fine of not more than $200 $250. 
  40. Id. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04.5 (AM LAW INST. 1985). 
  41. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 113. 
  42. See Minutes, supra note 26 (August 2014). 
  43. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V.  
  44. I neglected to do this in the first article, using the Model Code designation 
throughout.  
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when we did not make many changes to the Model Code version.  We will 
begin with assault, which we adopted from the Model Code.  
 




 Article 211 of the Model Code deals with bodily injury that does 
not result in homicide, as well as situations in which bodily injury is 
threatened or risked.45  These crimes are assault,46 reckless endangerment,47 
and terroristic threats.48  The Committee adopted the Model Code’s version 
of assault with few changes.  Although we did make some additions, there 
is no need to separately analyze the version the Committee is proposing and 
the Model Code.  Mississippi actually based its current assault statute on 
the Model Code, adding some enhancements for assaulting designated 
public officials, as well as other situations,49 which the Committee retained 
 
  45. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 170 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  46. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
  47. See id. at § 211.2. 
  48. See id. at § 211.3. 
  49. This is the version of § 211.1 adopted by the Committee. Again, the regular 
text is the Model Code language, while the underlined portions are additions or changes 
to the Model Code. The italicized portions were taken from the Mississippi Code. See 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7. This statute is also reproduced in Appendix C. 
(1) Simple Assault. A person is guilty of assault if he: 
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury 
to another; or  
(b) criminally negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; 
or 
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious 
bodily injury.  
  
Simple assault is a Class A misdemeanor, except that Simple Assault is a Felony in the 
Fourth Degree if committed in the following circumstances against the following 
persons: 
(a) When acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment at the time of 
the assault: a statewide elected official; law enforcement officer; fireman; 
emergency medical personnel; public health personnel; social worker, family 
protection specialist or family protection worker employed by the Department 
of Human Services or another agency; Division of Youth Services personnel; 
any county or municipal jail officer; superintendent, principal, teacher or other 
instructional personnel, school attendance officer or  school bus driver; any 
member of the Mississippi National Guard or United States Armed Forces; a 
judge of a circuit, chancery, county, justice, municipal or youth court or a judge 
of the Court of Appeals or a justice of the Supreme Court; district attorney or 
legal assistant to a district attorney; county prosecutor or  municipal 
prosecutor; court reporter employed by a court, court administrator, clerk or 
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as well.50  The Committee also added a domestic violence statute, patterned 
on the Mississippi statute, which had been adopted by the legislature.51  The 
Committee further included the Model Code definitions—which 
Mississippi has not adopted—remedying the problem of undefined terms in 
the Mississippi statute.52 
 Assault53 and battery,54 at common law, were originally simple 
misdemeanors.55  Similarly, at early common law, attempt to commit any 
crime was a misdemeanor.56  This idea of punishing all attempts as 
misdemeanors was carried over into American jurisdictions, in which 
attempt was often not punished with significant severity.57  Thus, at one 
 
deputy clerk of the court; public defender; or utility worker; or 
(b) A legislator while the Legislature is in regular or extraordinary session or 
while otherwise acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment; or 
(c) A person who is sixty-five (65) years of age or older or a person who is a 
vulnerable person, as defined in Section 43-47-5; or 
(d) A child who is in the process of boarding or exiting a school bus and the 
actor is in the course of a  violation of Section 63-3-615. 
(2) Aggravated Assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: 
(a) attempts to cause a serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury 
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life; or 
(b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another 
with a deadly weapon.  
Aggravated assault under paragraph (a) is a felony of the second degree; aggravated 
assault under paragraph (b) is a felony of the third degree. 
See Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).  
  50. See Id. italicized portion of the statute. 
  51. Section 211.X. See Appendix A for the complete statute. This statute was 
taken from the Mississippi assault statute, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7, which should 
otherwise be repealed. See Appendix C. I am not going to explain in detail current law in 
Mississippi that the Committee adopted. I will focus instead on the changes to 
Mississippi law that the Committee is proposing.  
  52. However, the court has recommended in Fleming v. State, 604 So. 2d 280, 
293 (Miss. 1992), that the courts look at the Model Code’s definition of “serious bodily 
injury.” Although the Model Code defines bodily injury to require “physical pain, illness 
or any impairment,” Mississippi has no definition of “bodily injury,” which could lead to 
confusion. In Reining v. State, 606 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Miss. 1992), for example, the 
court said that “although there are no degrees of bodily injury stated in the statute, a 
minor injury is a ‘bodily injury’ even though it may not be a traumatic injury.”    
  53. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  54. See id. at 175. The ALI decided to use the term assault to cover all of the 
conduct proscribed, although many of the situations are more accurately termed batteries 
because this is the traditional term for such criminal conduct. The ALI also considered 
that since assault is the more familiar term, keeping the familiar terminology would 
enhance the acceptability of the Model Code. See id. at 174-75 n.1. 
  55. See id.at 175 (battery); see also id. at 180 (assault).  
  56. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 213 n. 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  57. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 11.2(a) (5th ed. 1986). 
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time, a defendant could get the death penalty for rape but could be charged 
only with a misdemeanor for an attempted rape.58  In addition, attempt 
required the defendant to come very close to commission of the target 
offense.59   
 The Model Code’s version of attempt, which the Committee 
adopted,60 corrects both problems, punishing attempt as severely as the 
crime intended in most cases and requiring only a substantial step that 
strongly corroborates the defendant’s intent, rather than requiring the 
defendant to be close to success.61  Because attempt at common law was a 
misdemeanor, various versions of aggravated assault were devised by 
legislation to punish more seriously such crimes as attempted murder and 
attempted rape.62  Because attempt is punished more severely under the 
Model Code, there is no longer the same need for aggravated assault.63  
Nevertheless, assault under the Model Code was still divided into simple 
and aggravated assault, but without the pressing need to fill in the gap left 
by the earlier practice of punishing all attempts as misdemeanors.64  
 
1. Simple Assault   
 
 Simple assault combines three related ideas, including common law 
assault, common law battery, and assault under the definition derived from 
torts, which is creating apprehension of a battery.65  Simple assault is 
defined as: (1) attempting to cause or “purposely, knowingly, or recklessly” 
causing bodily injury to another;66 (2) negligently causing “bodily injury to 
another with a deadly weapon,”67 or (3) attempting “by physical menace to 
put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”68 
 The common law defined assault as attempt to commit a battery.69  
Thus, under the Model Code, the first kind of assault, attempting to cause 
bodily injury, is derived from attempting to commit a battery; however, the 
drafters did not believe that attempt to cause merely an offensive touching, 
which was sufficient for common law battery, should be sufficient for 
 
  58. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  59. Id. at 184. 
  60. See Minutes, supra note 26 (October, November 1996). 
  61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  62. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 181-82. 
  63. See id. 
  64. See id.  
  65. See infra discussion accompanying notes 70-94. 
  66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  67. Id. Section 211.1(1)(b). 
  68. Id. Section 211.1(1)(c). 
  69. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 58 at § 16.1(a). 
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criminal liability.70  Consequently, the Model Code requires that the 
defendant attempt to cause bodily injury, which the Model Code defines as 
“physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.”71  The 
Committee adopted this definition.72  While under the common law, it was 
possible that threatening to spit on another would be sufficient to be an 
assault, under the Model Code, this would not be sufficient.  Other forms 
of offensive touching that do not constitute bodily injury are treated 
elsewhere.73  
 In addition, the Model Code does not require that assault be closer 
than other attempts to the completion of the target crime of battery, as 
required by the common law,74 by applying the general attempt statute to 
assault.75  Attempt is defined in section 5.01 of the Model Code as 
purposely taking a substantial step that strongly corroborates the 
defendant’s intent.76  Thus, assault will now include preparatory conduct 
that should be intercepted.77  Under this definition, the prior prevailing view 
 
  70. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
                71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.0(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
These are the definitions adopted by the Committee for this section. They are virtually 
unchanged from the proposed Model Code definitions. The stricken portion represents 
the only change: 
§ 211.0. Definitions 
In this Article, the definitions given in § 210.0 apply unless a different meaning plainly is 
required. 
§ 210.0. Definitions. 
In Articles 210-213, unless a different meaning plainly is required: 
 (1) “human being” means a person who has been born and is alive; 
 (2) “bodily injury” means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical 
condition; 
 (3) “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of 
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment 
of the function of any bodily member or organ; 
 (4) “deadly weapon” means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, 
material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is 
intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. 
See Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018). These definitions were inadvertently left out of 
the previous article that included the homicide crimes, to which these definitions also 
apply.  
  72. Id.  
  73. Such conduct may, for example, be dealt with as disorderly conduct under § 
250.2 or as harassment under § 250.4. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 185 
(AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  74. See id. at 184. 
  75. See id. 
  76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
  77. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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that the defendant had to have the present ability to carry out the battery is 
consequently also not required.78  
 In keeping with tradition, the Model Code does not use the term 
“battery,” but conduct that would be battery, is termed assault.79  Therefore, 
the second form of simple assault is “purposely, knowingly or recklessly” 
causing “bodily injury to another.”80  This conduct would be simple battery 
under the common law,81 except that battery under the common law could 
be committed if the defendant was criminally negligent.82  The Model Code 
drafters thought that causing bodily injury through criminal negligence, 
which requires only an objective standard, was insufficiently culpable to be 
criminal.  The thought is that if the defendant inadvertently caused bodily 
injury, he should not be criminally liable.83  Thus, if the defendant was 
criminally negligent in causing only bodily injury, he must be using a 
deadly weapon to be guilty of assault.84  
 As fully discussed in my first article, although the Model Code uses 
the term “negligence” throughout, the definition of “negligence” comports 
with the definition of criminal negligence.85  This is a major defect in the 
Model Code that the Committee and other states have rectified by using the 
term “criminal negligence” instead of merely “negligence.”86   
 Finally, because most states incorporated the tort definition of 
assault into their criminal laws, the drafters of the Model Code added a third 
definition of simple assault.  Under this definition, the defendant is guilty 
of simple assault if he “attempts by physical menace to put another in fear 
of imminent serious bodily injury.”87  The drafters believed that because 
assuming a threatening posture is too common and equivocal, the threat 
required should be “serious bodily injury.”88  Also, the drafters believed 
 
  78. Id. at 192. 
  79. Id. at 176 n.14. “The [Model Code] offense was then renamed ‘assault’ on 
the grounds that use of the familiar term would enhance acceptability of the Model Code 
proposals and that the offense as redefined was more in accord with common usage of 
that term.” Id. at 175.   
  80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  81. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 184 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  82. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 58 § 16.2(C). 
  83. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 189 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
               84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
               85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  86. See Johnson, supra note 2, discussion accompanying notes 111-113. It 
should be noted that Mississippi adopted the Model Code’s version of assault and 
retained the language of the Model Code relating to negligence without defining it as 
criminal negligence. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7. This statute is also reproduced in 
Appendix C. 
               87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
               88. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 192-93 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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that merely physically menacing bodily injury, which is defined in part as 
“physical pain,” could be too trivial to be criminalized.89  The Committee 
agreed with this position, so that physically menacing bodily injury is 
insufficient, and that serious bodily injury should be threatened.90  If the 
defendant actually intends to cause bodily injury, he will be guilty of assault 
under the first subsection.91  In addition he may also be guilty of the felony 
of terroristic threatening under Section 211.3.92  Other situations involving 
verbal, rather than physical menace, may constitute other crimes, such as 
attempted robbery.93 
 The Committee did make two changes to the Model Code’s version 
of simple assault.  One was the addition of enhanced punishments based on 
official status and other circumstances of the victim, which was preferred 
by the legislature in the current statute.94  The second change was to 
eliminate some of the following: The Model Code added to simple assault 
that “simple assault is a misdemeanor, unless committed in a fight or scuffle 
entered into by mutual consent, in which case, it is a petty misdemeanor.”  
The Committee proposes that the italicized portion not be included.95  In 
addition, the Committee classified assault as a Class A misdemeanor, 
except for the victim status enhancements noted above, which would be 
fourth degree felonies.96  The following forms of aggravated assault are 
classified as felonies.  
 
2. Aggravated Assault 
 
Even though the need for aggravated forms of assault is not as 
pressing under the Model Code proposals because of the more serious 
punishment for attempt as discussed above,97 there is still a need for some 
forms of aggravated assault not covered by attempt to commit other violent 
felonies.98  Thus, the Model Code punishes attempting to “cause serious 
bodily injury” or causing “such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
 
 89. Id. 
  90. See Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).  
  91. See supra note 50. 
  92. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985), discussed infra 
Section III. C. 
  93. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 193 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  94. See supra note 50; Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020). 
  95. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).  
  96. See supra note 50. 
  97. See supra discussion accompanying notes 57-65.  
 98. See infra discussion accompanying notes 100-112.  
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human life”  as aggravated assault, a second degree felony.99  The attempt 
to “cause or purposely or knowingly” causing “bodily injury to another with 
a deadly weapon” is classified as a third degree felony.100 
It is obvious that attempting to inflict serious bodily injury should 
be an aggravating factor for simple assault of the attempted-battery type, 
which only requires attempted bodily injury.  It is also clear that causing 
such injury should be an aggravating factor for simple assault of the type 
that would otherwise be simple battery under the common law.101  
Similarly, “causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon” is a common 
aggravation in statutory forms of aggravated assault.102  However, causing 
such injury “purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” requires some 
explanation.  
This explanation begins with the definition of murder under the 
Model Code, which  includes criminal homicide committed purposely, 
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.103  Because attempt requires that 
the defendant act purposefully, the only type of murder that may be 
attempted is purposeful murder.104  The other forms of murder that require 
only knowledge or extreme recklessness may not be punished as attempt.105  
Thus, the common law result would be that one who was acting extremely 
recklessly and brought about the death of a person was guilty of a serious 
felony.  However, one with the exact same state of mind whose victim did 
not happen to die was guilty of misdemeanor battery, if the victim was 
injured. If the victim was not injured, the actor would be not be guilty of 
any crime.106  Therefore, the Model Code has filled an important gap by 
punishing as a second degree felony conduct that results in serious bodily 
injury, when the defendant is acting with the state of mind required for 
murder but is not acting purposefully.107 
As noted, a deadly weapon is a common aggravating factor, so when 
the defendant attempts to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon, he is 
 
   99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 100. Id. at § 211.1(2)(b). 
 101. See supra discussion accompanying notes 54-57. 
 102. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 191 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1). See Johnson, supra note 2, at n.183. 
 104. See generally  LAFAVE, supra note 58 at § 11.3(a) (5th ed. 1986). 
 105.  Id. 
 106. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 189 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The 
person who shoots at random into a crowd and does not injure anyone will be guilty of 
reckless endangerment. See infra discussion accompanying notes 120-26. 
 107. Id. 
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guilty of a third degree felony.108  “Deadly weapon” is defined by the Model 
Code as “any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or 
substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or 
is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious 
bodily injury.”109  The Committee adopted this definition but eliminated the 
requirement that the weapon “be known to be” capable of producing death 
or serious bodily injury.110  The Model Code broadly defined deadly 
weapon to account for various instruments that a defendant might choose 
to bring about the bad result, such as automobiles, poisons, chemicals, 
explosives, as well as the obvious, guns and knives.111 
As discussed above, the Mississippi legislature added various other 
aggravating factors that the Committee incorporated into the statute, 
including assault against public officials or a child boarding a school bus.112  
Finally, as noted earlier, the legislature passed a separate domestic violence 
statute that the Committee retained as a separate statute, making no 
changes, except to conform the punishment to the Committee’s version of 
the Model Code penalties.113  
 The two other offenses in Article 211 fill in gaps left in the common 
law, which were only partially filled by specific statutes.114  Section 211.3, 
terroristic threats,115 penalizes serious behavior that went unpunished under 
the common law because it was not considered an assault or an attempt 
under the common law.116  Section 211.2, reckless endangering, covers 
other possible situations in which the defendant could recklessly endanger 
another, other than reckless driving or reckless use of firearms, which were 
commonly specifically proscribed.117 
 
B. Reckless Endangering 
 
 Prior to the Model Code, only discrete forms of reckless behavior 
not resulting in injury were commonly criminalized, such as driving 
recklessly and reckless use of firearms.118  Some states added more 
 
 108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 109. Id. at § 210.0(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 110. Minutes, supra note 26 (April, 2018).  
 111. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 191 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 112. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020). 
 113. Section 211.X Domestic Violence. See Appendix A for the full statute. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 would be repealed by the foregoing. See Appendix C. 
 114. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 116. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 195-96 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 118. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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categories, such as dropping objects from bridges and placing an 
obstruction on a railroad track.119  The Model Code replaces such statutes 
with a general prohibition of any reckless conduct that places another in 
danger of death or serious bodily injury.  The Committee adopted the 
following version of reckless endangering:  
 
 § 211.2. Recklessly Endangering Another Person. 
A person commits a Class A misdemeanor if he recklessly engages 
in conduct that which places or may place another person in danger 
of death or serious bodily injury. Recklessness and danger shall be 
presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the 
direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm 
to be loaded.120 
 
The Model Code added a presumption of recklessness when the defendant 
merely aims a firearm at another person.121  If harm actually results, the 
defendant would be guilty of assault122 or manslaughter, depending on the 
severity of the result.123  Obviously, the defendant who acts with a reckless 
state of mind that would have resulted in a felony, if the criminally 
proscribed result had occurred, should be criminally liable even if the result 
does not occur.  The crime is a broad catchall, so the Committee classified 
it as a Class A misdemeanor.124  
 In addition to reckless endangering, the Model Code filled another 
gap regarding threats to commit a crime to intimidate a person or the general 
public by developing the new crime of “terroristic threats.”125 
 
C. Terroristic Threats 
 
 Section 211.3 deals with situations in which the defendant threatens 
to commit a crime of violence in order to terrorize another person or a group 
of persons.  The section applies to serious threats that impair public order 
or personal security.126  Prior law usually covered only criminal coercion, 
which is also proscribed generally in section 215.5,127 or crimes that are 
 
 119. Id. at 195-96. 
 120. MODEL PENAL CODE §211.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See supra note 50.   
 123. If the incident resulted in the death, the defendant would be guilty of 
reckless manslaughter. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V. B.2 (c). 
 124. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 200-02 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 126. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 215.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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designed to force the victim to engage in prescribed behavior.128  For 
example, robbery requires a threat of violence to compel theft,129 and 
extortion requires a threat that also may include a threat of violence.130  
Both of these crimes are also covered specifically in the Model Code.131  
Prior law, however, did not proscribe a threat simply for the purpose of 
terrorizing, which is the purpose of terroristic threats under section 211.3.132  
 A terroristic threats charge is designed to punish the person who 
makes phone calls or writes letters to incite fear and distress in the victim, 
rather than to extort money.  In addition, the crime covers the situation in 
which the defendant makes the threat to cause evacuation of a public place 
and to cause serious alarm and inconvenience, regardless of whether the 
defendant intends to carry out the threat.133  
 The Committee made some changes to the Model Code’s 
proposal.134  The underlined portions were added by the Committee, and 
the stricken portions were deleted from the original Model Code version: 
 
§ 211.3. Terroristic Threats 
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he 
explicitly or implicitly threatens to commit any crime of 
violence serious bodily injury, kidnapping or arson with 
purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a 
building, place of assembly, or facility of public 
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public 
inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing 
such terror or inconvenience.135 
 
 The Committee added the language “explicitly or implicitly” to 
cover a threat such as “I know where your children are,” which is an 
implicit, but not an explicit, threat.  The Committee believed that for the 
defendant to be liable, he should not have to specify a crime to the victim, 
 
 128. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  The Committee is proposing to include extortion as a type of robbery. 
See Minutes supra note 26 (August 2020). 
 131. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1 and 223.4. Sex crimes discussed infra at V. 
also may involve threats.  
 132. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
Mississippi actually does have a threatening letter statute, but the punishment makes it a 
misdemeanor. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-85. This statute would be replaced by the 
Terroristic Threats statute. See infra discussion accompanying note 136. 
 133. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 207 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 134. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 135. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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but only make an implicit threat.136  We also defined the crimes that would 
be subject to the threat requirement to preclude inclusion of a threat to 
commit a simple assault, which would not be serious enough to justify 
punishment for a third degree felony.137  Finally, the defendant does not 
have to intend to terrorize but must only act “in reckless disregard of 
causing such terror or inconvenience.”138  If the victim is restrained in order 
to terrorize him, the crime would relate to kidnapping and related crimes, 
which we will discuss next.  
 
IV. KIDNAPPING AND RELATED CRIMES 
 
 Article 212 of the Model Code was intended to restructure the law 
of kidnapping.139  The main problem with many kidnapping laws, as 
exemplified by the current Mississippi law,140 is that the laws are too broad, 
imposing severe penalties for what could be trivial conduct.141  For this 
reason, the Model Code divided kidnapping and related offenses into 
crimes of diminishing seriousness, from section 212.1, which may be a first 
degree felony; to felonious restraint in section 212.2, which is a third degree 
felony; to false imprisonment, which is a misdemeanor.142  Article 212 also 
includes the related crimes of interference with custody in section 212.4 
and criminal coercion in section 212.5.143  
 The Committee changed the Model Code’s term “kidnapping” 
under section 212.1 to “Aggravated Kidnapping” and rearranged the 
 
 136. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018). This statute would replace the 
following Mississippi statute: 
§ 97-3-85. Threats and intimidation; by letter or notice 
If any person shall post, mail, deliver, or drop a threatening 
letter or notice to another, whether such other be named or 
indicated therein or not, with intent to terrorize or to 
intimidate such other, he shall, upon conviction, be punished 
by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months, 
or by fine not more than five hundred dollars, or both. 
The Committee is still working on an internet bullying and assisted suicide statute. 
 137. See supra note 26. 
 138. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 139. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 210 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
 140. See infra discussion accompanying notes 177-81. 
 141. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 210 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 142. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 143. The Committee had added Interstate Removal of a Child Under Age 
Fourteen by Noncustodial Parent or Relative but decided that since this statute was part 
of a uniform law, we would delete it in favor of the current Mississippi scheme. MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-51. Compare Minutes, supra note 26 (October 1998) with Minutes, 
supra note 26 (June 2018).  
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statute, as will be noted below.144  However, the basic concept of the Model 
Code’s most serious kidnapping offense was retained.145  The Committee 
also designated section 212.2 as simply “kidnapping,” again retaining the 
Model Code’s basic idea expressed in the original version of section 212.2, 
which the Model Code termed “felonious restraint.”146  
 
A. Kidnapping (Aggravated Kidnapping) 
 
 Section 212.1 of the Model Code defines the most serious offense 
as kidnapping,147 which, as noted, the Committee re-named “aggravated 
kidnapping.”148  This most serious form of kidnapping involves substantial 
removal or confinement for specified purposes: to hold for ransom or 
reward, to interfere with the performance of a governmental function, to 
inflict bodily injury or to terrorize anyone, or to facilitate the commission 
of a felony.149  The removal or confinement must be by “force, threat or 
 
 144. The Committee adopted the following: 
Section 212.0 Definitions 
1) In this article, the definitions given in Section 210.0 apply unless a different 
meaning plainly is required. 
2) For purposes of this Article, “unlawful” or “unlawfully” refers to any 
affirmative violation of legal duty, whether it amounts to a violation of the 
criminal law, civil law, or administrative regulation. 
Minutes, supra note 26 (August 2019). See supra note 72 for the definitions in Section 
210.0 that apply. 
 145. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 146. Id. 
 147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 148. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 149. This is the original Model Penal Code version:  
§ 212.1 Kidnapping. A person is guilty of kidnapping if he 
unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or 
business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is 
found, or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial 
period in a place of isolation, with any of the following 
purposes:  
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or  
(b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; 
or  
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another; or  
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function.  
Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the actor 
voluntarily releases the victim alive and in a safe place prior to 
trial, in which case it is a felony of the second degree. A 
removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this 
section if it is accomplished by force, threat or deception, or, in 
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deception (or in the case of a person who is under the age of fourteen or 
incompetent, without consent of a parent, guardian or other person 
responsible for general supervision of his welfare).”150  Under the Model 
Code, kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the victim is 
voluntarily released without serious bodily injury prior to trial.  If not, 
kidnapping is a felony of the second degree.151  The Committee agreed with 
most of the Model Code’s ideas, but rearranged, re-named, and re-worded 
the statute as follows:  
 
 Section 212.1 Aggravated Kidnapping. 
A person is guilty of aggravated kidnapping if, by force, 
threat or deception (or in the case of a person who is under 
the age of 14 or incompetent, without consent of a parent, 
guardian or other person responsible for general supervision 
of his welfare) he:   
 (a) confines or removes another to hold for ransom 
or reward, or as a shield  or hostage; or  
 (b) removes another from his place of residence or 
business, or moves him  a substantial distance from 
the vicinity where he is found, or confines  another for a 
substantial period in a place of isolation, with any of the 
 following purposes: 
  (1) to facilitate commission of any felony or 
flight thereafter; or 
  (2) to inflict serious bodily injury on or to 
terrorize the victim or   another.  
Aggravated Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless 
the defendant establishes, as an affirmative defense, that the 
defendant voluntarily released the victim without serious 
bodily injury in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is 
a felony of the second degree. That the defendant voluntarily 
released the victim without serious bodily injury and in a 
safe place prior to trial mitigates aggravated kidnapping 
 
the case of a person who is under the age of 14 or incompetent, 
if it is accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian 
or other person responsible for general supervision of his 
welfare.   
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).   
 150. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 223-24 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 151. Id. at 227. 
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from a first degree felony to a second degree felony and need 
not be proven in any prosecution under this section.152  
 
 At noted above, one of the main deficiencies in the then-current 
statutes cited by the drafters of the Model Code was that kidnapping could 
apply to trivial conduct that amounted to some exercise of physical control 
over another person, such as a situation in which a defendant merely held 
another person by the arm to make a point.153  Thus, what would otherwise 
be kidnapping was divided into three separate crimes, punishing less 
serious forms of physical restraint more proportionately.  The challenge 
was to distinguish this other less serious conduct from kidnapping.154 
 One of the important innovations of the Model Code was to confine 
kidnapping to specified purposes.  In addition to requiring that the 
defendant use force, threat, or deception,155 the defendant must also remove 
the victim with a purpose to: (a) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or 
as a shield or hostage, or (b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight 
thereafter, or (c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another, or (d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function.156  The Committee adopted purposes (a) through (c), but 
did not adopt subsection (d) for reasons discussed below.157 
 Another problem with earlier kidnapping statutes that had been 
developed in this country was derived from substantially weakening or 
eliminating the common law requirement of asportation or moving the 
victim.  Under these statutes, kidnapping could be charged in any type of 
unlawful physical control of another, such as in the case of rape.158  The 
need for removing the asportation requirement might have been caused by 
inadequacies in the law of attempt, as discussed with regard to the assault 
crimes.159  
 To summarize the earlier discussion, at common law, attempt to 
commit any crime was a misdemeanor.160  The Model Code’s version of 
attempt punishes attempt as severely as the crime intended in most cases.  
Attempt under the Model Code also requires only that the defendant’s act 
 
 152. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). Compare this version with the Model 
Code version cited supra note 150. 
 153. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Or, in the case of a child under fourteen or an incompetent person, without 
consent of the parent or guardian. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).   
 156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 157. See infra discussion accompanying note 167. 
 158. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 212 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 159. See supra discussion accompanying notes 57-63. 
 160. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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be a substantial step to be sufficient for attempt, rather than requiring the 
defendant to be close to success.161  Therefore, using kidnapping to punish 
behavior that is preparation for another crime is no longer necessary.162 
 The Committee agreed with the idea that kidnapping should 
contemplate unlawful substantial removal or confinement with regard to the 
other specified purposes, but thought that “holding for ransom and using as 
a shield” should be treated as aggravated kidnapping without requiring that 
the victim be moved a substantial distance.163  Thus, if the defendant 
removes or confines the victim to hold him for ransom or to use him as a 
hostage, he is guilty of aggravated kidnapping.  Otherwise, to be guilty of 
kidnapping under section 212.1, the defendant must—with purpose to 
inflict serious bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or to facilitate a 
felony—remove the victim from his residence or move him a substantial 
distance or confine the victim for a substantial period of time.164  
 One of the important innovations of the Model Code was to limit 
kidnapping to specified purposes, as noted above.165  The Committee 
agreed that the following are important and clear purposes: to hold for 
ransom or reward, to use the victim as a shield or hostage, to terrorize the 
victim, or to facilitate a crime.  However, with regard to the purpose of 
interfering “with the performance of any governmental or political 
function,” the Committee feared that interference with a public function 
would be too broad, so we are not proposing the adoption of that part of the 
Model Code.166  
 The original version of the Model Code requires that the 
confinement or removal must be “unlawful,” which is defined as “by force, 
threat or deception.”167  However, in the case of a child under fourteen or 
one who is incompetent, the thought was that either could be enticed 
without consent of a guardian, so that force, threat, or deception was not a 
necessary requirement.  The Committee re-drafted the statute, so that there 
is no need to specify that the confinement or removal is unlawful because 
the purposes for which the person is confined or removed would clearly be 
unlawful: to hold for ransom or as hostage or to commit a crime or to 
terrorize him.  The Committee believed that the word “unlawful” in this 
statute would cause confusion.168  
 
 161. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 162. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 163. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See supra discussion accompanying notes 148-150. 
 166. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
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 The Committee agreed with the Model Code’s idea that, if the 
defendant voluntarily releases the victim without serious bodily injury 
before the trial, the crime should be reduced to a second-degree felony.  The 
extreme sanction of a first degree felony, which is also imposed only for 
murder and a very few aggravated felonies,169 should be reserved for 
situations in which the victim is not released voluntarily or is seriously 
injured.170  Section 210.0(3), as adopted by the Committee, defines “serious 
bodily injury” as any physical injury that “creates a substantial risk of death 
or that causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”171  The 
rationale is to encourage the defendant to voluntarily release the victim 
alive and not seriously harmed.  The great fear in all kidnapping cases is 
that the victim will be killed in the process.  Deterring this result is surely a 
worthy goal.172  
 The Committee believed that the affirmative defense of “releasing 
the victim prior to trial” should be clarified, in addition to the other changes 
discussed above.  The Committee reporter, Matthew Steffey, redrafted the 
statute to reflect these changes, as he often did, and we adopted this version, 
dividing the crime into aggravated kidnapping and kidnapping,173 the latter 
having been denominated “felonious restraint” in the original Model Code 
version.174  We also clarified that, as opposed to the usual procedure for 
affirmative defenses under the Model Code, the prosecution does not have 
the burden of disproving this affirmative defense once it is raised.175 
 The current Mississippi statute concerning kidnapping suffers from 
all the deficiencies cited by the drafters of the Model Code.176  First, it could 
 
 169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018); note 72. 
 172. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 233 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 173. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 174. See infra notes 183-84. 
 175. Compare infra note 256 with discussion accompanying notes 174-76. 
176. MISS. CODE ANN.  § 97-3-53. Kidnapping; punishment 
Any person who, without lawful authority and with or without 
intent to secretly confine, shall forcibly seize and confine any 
other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with 
intent to cause such person to be confined or imprisoned 
against his or her will, or without lawful authority shall 
forcibly seize, inveigle or kidnap any vulnerable person as 
defined in Section 43-47-5 or any child under the age of 
sixteen (16) years against the will of the parents or guardian 
or person having the lawful custody of the child, upon 
conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the 
jury in its verdict. If the jury fails to agree on fixing the 
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apply to trivial conduct.  In addition, the same conduct by different 
defendants could be punished by a sentence from one year to thirty years,177 
a defect in the Mississippi criminal statutes generally, and one of the main 
reasons Mississippi ranks dead last among criminal codes.178  The current 
statute does not require asportation or even confinement for a substantial 
period of time, so that kidnapping could be  charged in addition to other 
crimes against the person that require restraint, such as rape.179  
For these reasons, this statute would be repealed by the adoption of 
sections 212.1-3.  Section 212.2 (felonious restraint) and section 212.3 
(false imprisonment) are lesser included offenses to kidnapping180 and will 
now be discussed.   
 
B. Felonious Restraint (Kidnapping) 
 
 The Committee adopted the Model Code version of felonious 
restraint,181 renaming it simply “kidnapping.”182  I will refer to it as “simple 
kidnapping” for purposes of this discussion to distinguish it from the more 
serious form of the crime, which the Committee denominated “aggravated 
kidnapping.” The Committee proposes the following: 
 
 Section 212.2 Kidnapping 
 A person is guilty of kidnapping if he knowingly: 
(a) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing 
him to risk of serious bodily injury; or 
(b) holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. 
 Kidnapping is a felony of the third degree.183 
 
penalty at imprisonment for life, the court shall fix the penalty 
at not less than one (1) year nor more than thirty (30) years in 
the custody of the Department of Corrections. 
This section shall not be held to repeal, modify or amend any 
other criminal statute of this state. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Johnson, supra note 2, at IV. 
 179. For example, rape requires restraint. See infra discussion accompanying 
note 290. 
 180. See Appendix D. 
 181. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Original Model Penal 
Code version:  
Section 212.2 Felonious Restraint  
 A person commits a felony of the third degree if he knowingly: 
(a) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily 
injury; or 
(b) holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. 
 182. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 183. Id.  
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 Section 212.2 applies when the defendant holds another in 
involuntary servitude or unlawfully restrains another in such a manner as to 
expose him to risk of serious bodily injury.184  Section 212.2 requires only 
that the victim be subjected to the risk of serious bodily injury.185 
 Simple kidnapping is distinguished from aggravated kidnapping 
by eliminating the elements of substantial removal or confinement required 
for aggravated kidnapping, as well as defining less serious purposes than 
those required for aggravated kidnapping.186  For example, if a defendant 
unlawfully restrains another person for an insubstantial period of time and 
exposes him to a risk of serious bodily injury even in a public place, he may 
be guilty of kidnapping but not aggravated kidnapping.  In such cases, the 
defendant has not substantially removed or isolated the victim from 
protection of the law, which could have increased the dangerousness of the 
crime.  Simple kidnapping does not require the specified purposes of 
subjecting the victim to serious bodily injury, terrorizing or holding him for 
ransom or as a hostage, or facilitating the commission of a crime.187  For 
example, if the defendant uses a weapon to force the victim to drive him to 
another place, he is guilty of aggravated kidnapping if he is escaping from 
a bank robbery.  If he is not fleeing the commission of a crime and has none 
of the other purposes specified for aggravated kidnapping but just needs a 
ride, he may be guilty of simple kidnapping.  This is because he is armed 
and is exposing the victim to risk of serious bodily harm.188  Simple 
kidnapping is still a serious felony of the third degree.189  
 While aggravated kidnapping requires that the defendant act 
purposefully, in other words that he intends one of the specified purposes, 
simple kidnapping requires the defendant to act knowingly, which means 
that he must know that “his conduct is of that nature or that such 
circumstances exist.”190  Accordingly, he must be aware that he is 
unlawfully restraining his victim and exposing him to the risk of danger. 
 In simple kidnapping, the action giving rise to a risk of danger must 
amount to unlawful restraint.  Because aggravated kidnapping requires 
serious purposes, the necessity of adding the term “unlawful” to the statute 
is obviated.  However, sections 212.2 and 212.3 do not require the same 
purposes.  Consequently, for simple kidnapping and false imprisonment, 
there is a need for the restraint to be unlawful, which the Committee defined 
as: 
 
 184. See supra note 72 for the definition of serious bodily injury. 
 185. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 186. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 240 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 187. Id. at 241. 
 188. Id. 
 189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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 Section 212.0 Definitions 
. . . . 
2) For purposes of this Article, “unlawful” or “unlawfully” refers to 
any affirmative violation of legal duty, whether it amounts to a 
violation of the criminal law, civil law, or administrative 
regulation.191 
 
This definition applies to the final form of unlawful restraint, section 212.3, 
False Imprisonment, as well.  
 As discussed below with regard to section 212.4 (interference 
with custody), restraint by one parent in violation of a custody order would 
be included within the prohibition of section 212.2 as “unlawful” conduct.  
However, the purposes required for kidnapping, involuntary servitude or 
risk of serious bodily injury, would generally not be present.  If they were, 
the non-custodial parent could be guilty of kidnapping, but not aggravated 
kidnapping, which requires that the child be taken without consent of a 
parent.192  The effect of all this is to include within the kidnapping offense 
removal of a child under the age of fourteen by a stranger without the 
consent of an appropriate guardian.  The offense was not designed to 
broaden liability for parental conduct nor to extend the offense of 
kidnapping into intra-family custody disputes.193  
 We will now look at false imprisonment, the least serious form of 
unlawful restraint.  
 
C. False Imprisonment 
 
 The Committee adopted the Model Code version of false 
imprisonment, classifying it as a Class A misdemeanor:194 
 
           Section 212.3 False Imprisonment 
 A person commits a Class A misdemeanor if he knowingly 
restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his 
liberty.195 
 
While simple kidnapping under section 212.2 includes unlawful restraint 
that exposes the victim to risk of serious bodily injury or that holds another 
 
 191. Minutes, supra note 26 (July 2019). 
 192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 193. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 251 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 194. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 195. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).    
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in involuntary servitude,196 false imprisonment requires only that the 
defendant “knowingly restrain another unlawfully so as to interfere 
substantially with his liberty.”197  Both offenses require knowledge of the 
unlawful nature of the restraint,198 as defined above.199  The restraint must 
be unlawful, so that restraint of a child by a parent, for example, would not 
be false imprisonment; however, restraint of a child unlawfully by another 
adult would constitute false imprisonment.  The restraint must also 
“substantially” interfere with the victim’s liberty to preclude application in 
situations that may justify civil, but not criminal, sanction.200  
 Because of the serious purposes required for simple kidnapping, it 
is a felony of the third degree, while false imprisonment is a 
misdemeanor,201 which the Committee classified as a Class A 
misdemeanor.202  Furthermore, criminal coercion under section 212.5, 
discussed below,203 may cover other situations in which the victim’s liberty 
is interfered with.204  Because of the possibly broad coverage of section 
212.3 and because more serious conduct is punished in other sections, a 
Class A misdemeanor punishment was considered appropriate.205  
 The next statutes are related to kidnapping, but without the 
requirement of physical restraint.  While simple restraint of a child by a 
parent would not be considered criminal, interfering with custody of a child 
could be. 
 
D. Interference With Custody 
 
 Section 212.4 defines the offense of interference with custody.206  
The offense applies to situations in which the defendant takes or entices a 
 
 196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 198. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 199. Section 212.0(2), as added by the Committee. See supra discussion 
accompanying note 192. 
 200. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 247 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 201. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 
(AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 202. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 203. See infra Section IV. E.  
 204. In addition, MODEL PENAL CODE §243.1 (AM LAW INST. 1985) applies to 
restraint amounting to official oppression, such as illegal arrest. See Minutes, supra note 
26 (July 2011) for the Committee’s version of §243.1. 
 205. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 206. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM LAW INST. 1985). The committee 
originally adopted a statute borrowed from the Uniform Child Custody Act but decided 
to retain the uniform act as it stands in the Mississippi Code. See Minutes, supra note 26 
(June 2018). 
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child or committed person from lawful custody.  The Committee adopted 
the Model Code version, with a few changes, as noted: 
 
Section 212.4 
(1) Custody of Children. A person commits an offense if he 
knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 
18 from the custody of its parent, guardian or other lawful 
custodian, when he has no privilege to do so. It is an affirmative 
defense that: 
(a) the actor reasonably believed that his action was 
necessary to preserve the child from danger to its welfare; 
or 
(b) the child, being at the time not less than 14 years old, 
was taken away at its own instigation without enticement 
and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or 
against the child.  
Proof that the child was below the critical age gives rise to 
a presumption that the actor knew the child's age or acted 
in reckless disregard thereof. The offense is a Class A 
misdemeanor unless the actor, not being a parent or person 
in equivalent relation to the child, acted with knowledge 
that his conduct would cause serious alarm for the child's 
safety, or in reckless disregard of a likelihood of causing 
such alarm, in which case the offense is a felony of the 
third fourth degree. 
(2) Custody of Committed Persons. A person is guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor if he knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any 
committed person away from lawful custody when he is not 
privileged to do so. “Committed person” means, in addition to 
anyone committed under judicial warrant, any orphan, neglected or 
delinquent child, mentally defective or insane person, or other 
dependent or incompetent person entrusted to another’s custody by 
or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by authority of 
law.207 
 
 Interference with custody could occur if the child is taken from a 
parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian.  Thus, the non-custodial parent 
could be guilty of interference with custody, rather than kidnapping, which 
could have been charged under earlier statutes.208  The section is drafted in 
part to limit the intrusion of the criminal law into child custody disputes but 
 
 207. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 208. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 249 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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at the same time to permit criminal intervention in appropriate cases.209  
Section 212.4 also applies when a defendant takes or entices from lawful 
custody a person who has been committed.210  Section 212.4 is a lesser 
included offense to kidnapping in cases in which the kidnapping purposes 
cannot be shown, but custody has been infringed on by persons having no 
legal authority to do so.211   
 As opposed to simple and aggravated kidnapping, which protect 
against abduction causing physical danger, extortion, terrorization, or 
involuntary servitude,212 section 212.4 is directed at interference with 
lawful custody of children and committed persons.213  Because the person 
interfering with custody will often be another parent, relative, or person 
who acts based on the perceived best interest of the child or committed 
person, the offense is punished less severely than kidnapping and has 
special defenses.214  A kidnapping charge is still possible if the requisite 
purposes are present; however, if not, the defendant is guilty of the lesser 
offense of interference with custody.215  
 The offense regarding interference with custody of children requires 
that the actor knowingly or recklessly take or entice a child under eighteen 
from its legal custodian when he has no privilege to do so.216  Such privilege 
could come from consent by the custodian, court order, or statute.217  There 
are two affirmative defenses recognized under this subsection.  The first is 
that the actor “believed that his action was necessary to preserve the child 
from danger to its welfare.”218  The Committee decided that the actor should 
“reasonably” believe that the action was necessary.219  Reasonable belief 
under section 1.13 requires that the actor not be criminally negligent in his 
 
 209. Id. at 253. 
 210. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the 
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).(AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 211. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1985), which defines lesser included offenses. This will be the subject of a later 
article.  
 212. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.1; 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted 
by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM LAW INST. 1985). 
 213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the 
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM LAW INST. 1985). 
 214. MODEL PENAL CODE Art 212 cmt. at 251-52 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 215. See supra discussion accompanying note 208. 
 216. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the 
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM LAW INST. 1985). 
 217. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 257 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 218. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (AM LAW INST. 
1985). 
 219. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
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belief;220 otherwise, the affirmative defense would require the actor’s belief 
to be at least reckless to lose the defense.  This would occur by operation 
of section 2.02, which provides that any element of an offense without a 
specified state of mind will generally require recklessness.221  The 
Committee usually did not approve of leaving state of mind to the operation 
of section 2.02 but preferred wherever possible to specify the state of mind.  
 The second defense recognizes that a child between the ages of 
fourteen and eighteen has a mind of his own. If he arranges for his own 
removal without being enticed, and the actor has no purpose of committing 
a criminal offense with or against the child, the actor should have a 
defense.222  
 If the child is actually under the age of eighteen under subsection 
(1) (or less than fourteen under the affirmative defense provided for in 
subsection (1)(b)), there is a presumption that the actor knew or recklessly 
disregarded the child’s age.223  This offense is a Class A misdemeanor 
unless the actor is not a parent or person in equivalent relation, and he knew 
or acted with reckless disregard that the removal would cause serious alarm, 
in which case the offense is a felony in the fourth degree.224  In the case of 
a parent who may also cause such alarm, the assumption is that fear for 
safety is less justified because the child is with a parent who has a protective 
instinct with regard to his own child.225  If the child is in fact threatened 
with harm, the offense could rise to the level of kidnapping.226 
 The comments to the Model Code discuss three possible scenarios 
to illustrate the effect of the section.  The first is the removal of a child over 
the age of eighteen who is not under a commitment order.  If such a removal 
does not involve force, threat, or deception required for aggravated 
 
 220. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
General Definitions 
. . . . 
(16) “reasonably believes” or “reasonable belief” designates a belief that the actor is not 
reckless or criminally negligent in holding. 
Minutes, supra note 26 (December 2006). 
 221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM LAW INST. 1985). See Johnson, supra note 
2, at IV. 
 222. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 258 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 223. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the 
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 224. Id. (as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
(AM. LAW INST. 1985). The original version of the MPC only had three degrees of 
felonies. The Committee added fourth degree felony. See supra note 26. This offense 
was classified as a third-degree felony under the original Model Code Version MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 225. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 226. Id.  
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kidnapping or any of the purposes required for simple kidnapping, this 
would not be kidnapping or interference with custody.227  A child of this 
age is capable of consenting, even if the legal guardian has not consented.228  
 The second situation is removal of a child between the ages of 
fourteen and eighteen from the custody of a legal guardian without that 
person’s consent.  Again, if there is no force, threat, or deception or a 
prohibited purpose, the offense would not be kidnapping because the victim 
has consented. However, this offense would be interference with custody 
because the legal custodian must also consent, unless an affirmative defense 
applies.229  Third, if the child is under fourteen and, therefore, incapable of 
consenting or is incompetent, this would be kidnapping, if the prohibited 
purposes were present. If the prohibited purposes were not shown, the 
offense would be interference with custody, absent an affirmative 
defense.230  
 A parent may not be guilty of aggravated kidnapping of his own 
underage child because aggravated kidnapping specifically provides for 
lack of parental consent,231 but he may be guilty of interference with 
custody.232  If one of the prohibited purposes is present, the parent may also 
be guilty of simple kidnapping if he knows the restraint is unlawful, which 
could include violating a custody order.233  The fact that simple kidnapping 
requires knowledge that the conduct is unlawful would prevent the section 
from operating in a situation in which custody is in dispute.234  A parent 
violating a custody order may also be guilty of false imprisonment under 
section 212.3, which is also a misdemeanor, and only requires that the actor 
know the restraint to be unlawful, which would include violating a custody 
agreement.235  
 With regard to custody of committed persons under subsection (2), 
if the actor knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any committed person 
from lawful custody without privilege, he is guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor.  “Committed person” is defined as anyone “under judicial 
warrant, any orphan, neglected or delinquent child, mentally defective or 
 
 227. Id. at 253. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE  §§ 212.1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (as 
adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018)(AM. LAW INST. 1985)  
with MODEL PENAL CODE  § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the 
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 232. Id. 
 233. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 256 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 234. Id. 
 235. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the 
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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insane person, or other dependent or incompetent person entrusted to 
another’s custody by or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by 
authority of law.”236  Special defenses are not provided in this subsection 
because of the fact that the committed person is subject to judicial authority, 
which should put the actor on notice that his conduct is wrongful.237  
However, as noted in the comments, if any of the defenses to subsection (1) 
were present in a case under subsection (2), prosecutorial discretion should 
be exercised.238 
 The next section is related to kidnapping in that the victim’s 
freedom of action is restrained.  Even if he is not restrained physically, he 
is still limited in his actions by the actor’s threats.   
 
E. Criminal Coercion 
 
 Section 212.5 defines the offense of criminal coercion.239  This 
section is designed as a residual offense, punishing threats to take specified 
action with a purpose to unlawfully restrict the freedom of action of another 
person to his detriment.240  The Committee adopted the following version 
of criminal coercion, making several changes from the original version, as 
indicated: 
 
 Section 212.5 Criminal Coercion 
 (1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, 
with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage 
or refrain from engaging in conduct to his detriment, he recklessly 
threatens, explicitly or implicitly, to: 
  (a) commit any criminal offense; or 
  (b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or 
  (c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to 
hatred, contempt or     ridicule, or to impair his 
credit or business repute; or 
  (d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an 
official to take or     withhold action. 
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (b), 
(c) or (d) that the actor reasonably believed the accusation or secret 
to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his 
purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way 
 
 236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
 237. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 262 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 238. Id. 
 239. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 240. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 264 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of 
the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting 
from further misbehavior, making …good a wrong done, refraining 
from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes 
the other disqualified. 
 
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section 
that:  
(a) the actor reasonably believed the accusation or secret to 
be true or the proposed action justified, and 
(b)(i) that the primary purpose of the threat was to cause the 
other to conduct himself in his own best interest; or 
(b)(ii) that a purpose of the threat was to cause the other to 
desist from immoral or unreasonable conduct, engage in 
behavior from which he could not lawfully abstain, make  
good a wrong done by him, or refrain from taking any action 
or responsibility for which he was disqualified. 
 
(2) (3) Grading. (a) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the third degree 
if the threat is to commit a felony in the first or second degree or the 
actor’s purpose is felonious in the first or second degree. 
(b) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the fourth degree if the threat is 
to commit a felony in the third degree or the actor’s purpose is to 
commit a felony in the third degree. 
(c)  Otherwise, Criminal Coercion is a Class A Misdemeanor.241 
 
  Since criminal coercion is a residual offense, it compliments other 
offenses involving threats,242 such as extortion243 and robbery,244 both of 
which require that the threat be made to acquire property.245  To avoid 
overbroad enforcement, criminal coercion applies only to a limited category 
of threats that must be made with an improper purpose to limit a person’s 
freedom of action.246  
 
 241. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2019). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 264 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). In 
addition, the following crimes also involve threats: Theft of Services under § 223.7, 
Terroristic Threats under § 211.3, Assault under § 211.1, Criminal Mischief under § 
220.3, and Improper Influence Over Public Officials and Others under § 240.2. See id. In 
addition, some of the sex crimes, discussed infra at V. involve threats.  
 246. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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 There are four types of threats.  Again, they all must be made with 
the purpose of unlawfully restricting another’s freedom of action.247  The 
Committee made several changes to the language of the Model Code.  First, 
the Committee decided that the threat could be “explicit or implicit.”248  The 
original Model Code version defined “freedom of action” in the comments, 
but not in the statute, to be anything the victim does not want to do or not 
do that works to his detriment.249  The Committee decided that this was 
unclear, so we added to “freedom of action” in the statute “to engage or 
refrain from engaging in conduct.”250  We also eliminated “to his detriment” 
because we believed that limiting freedom of action sufficiently defined the 
conduct.251 
 The original Model Code provided that, if the action is for the good 
of the person, it is not covered by this section252 since the action must limit 
the victim’s freedom of action to his detriment.253  This idea was also 
reinforced in the affirmative defenses, discussed below. 254  As noted, the 
Committee removed the language “to his detriment,” deciding that a proper 
purpose should be an affirmative defense.255 
 
 247. Id. at 264. 
 248. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2019). 
 249. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 250. See supra Committee’s version of the statute § 212.5(2) at discussion 
accompanying note 242. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id.  
 256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 254. Id. 
 255. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The 
Committee adopted the Model Code’s scheme for affirmative defenses, which requires 
the defendant to raise the defense and the prosecution to prove its absence beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Minutes, supra note 26 (October, November, December 2006).  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
(1) No person shall be convicted of an offense unless each 
element of such offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is 
assumed. 
(2) Subsection (1) of this Section does not: 
(a) Require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless 
and until there is evidence  supporting such defense; or 
(b) Apply to any defense that the Code or another statute 
plainly requires the  defendant to disprove by a 
preponderance of the evidence; or 
. . . . 
Thus, absent a statutory requirement, the prosecution must disprove any affirmative 
defense not plainly requiring the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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 The original version of the Model Code also required that the actor 
restrain the victim’s freedom of action “unlawfully.”256  However, as 
opposed to the other sections in this Article that use the term unlawfully—
defining it as “any violation of the criminal law, civil law or administrative 
regulation”257—the Model Code comments defined “unlawfully” 
differently in this section: The actor has to intend to coerce conduct he has 
no legal right to require.  Again, this definition was suggested by the Model 
Code comments but was not defined in the statute.258  The Committee 
deleted the reference to “unlawfully” because the addition to “freedom of 
action” of “engaging in or refraining from conduct,” which should cover 
what the victim does or does not want to do.259   
 The list of threats for criminal coercion does not include all the 
threats included for extortion, which requires the purpose of acquiring 
property; the justification being that this is more obviously wrongful.260  
The first threat that could be criminal coercion is to threaten “to commit 
any criminal offense.”261  The second is “to accuse anyone of a criminal 
offense.”262  The third threat is less obvious and, that is, to threaten to 
“expose a secret that would cause the person to be ridiculed, hated, held in 
contempt, or that would impair his credit or business repute.”263  The last is 
to threaten to “take or withhold official action,” either because the 
defendant is an official or because the victim is an official.264   
 When the actor’s purpose is benign, coercion should not be 
criminal.  Therefore, the Committee adopted the Model Code’s affirmative 
defenses in this regard but restructured and clarified them.265  The 
affirmative defenses are designed to prevent interference with legitimate 
bargaining and other similar situations.266  The defenses do not apply to 
subsection (a) because commission of a crime would never be justified 
under this subsection.  However, with regard to the other purposes, if the 
actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official 
action justified, the defense would apply.  In addition, the purpose must be 
to require the person to correct his unreasonable or immoral behavior, right 
 
 256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 257. Minutes, supra note 26 (July 2019). 
 258. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 259. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2019). 
 260. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 266.  The Committee is proposing to 
include extortion as a type of robbery. See Minutes supra note 26 (August 2020). 
 261. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 262. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 263. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 264. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  265. See supra note 256. 
 266. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 267 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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a wrong, or prevent the other person from taking action for which he is 
disqualified.267  The original Model Code version used the term 
“misbehavior.”  The Committee substituted the term “immoral or 
unreasonable behavior,” which is the definition suggested by the Model 
Code comments.268 
 Advising a driver to slow down or be reported would be an example 
of requiring the person to cease unreasonable or immoral behavior.269  An 
example of threatening to expose a secret to encourage the victim to correct 
his unreasonable or immoral behavior would be to threaten to disclose an 
alcoholic’s secret drinking to force him into treatment.  Threatening to 
accuse another of theft if he does not return the property would be an 
example of righting a wrong within the defense.270  Using a threat to prevent 
another from assuming a position for which he is unqualified would also 
apply here.271  
  The Committee refined the grading scheme so that, if the threat is 
to commit a felony in the first or second degree or the actor has a purpose 
that is felonious in the first or second degree, criminal coercion is a felony 
in the third degree.  If the felony intended or threatened is a felony in the 
third degree, the offense is a felony in the fourth degree.  The offense is 
otherwise a misdemeanor, which the Committee classified as a Class A 
misdemeanor.272  
 We turn now to the most controversial set of crimes, sex crimes.  
 
V. SEX CRIMES 
 
 Article 213 of the Model Code, which relates to sex crimes, was 
outdated and unsatisfactory, so the Committee completely revamped the 
sex crimes article by referring to Mississippi statutes that existed at that 
time.273  The Committee also reviewed the sex crimes statutes of other states 
and decided to use Tennessee statutes as a model.274 
 
 267. Id. at 268. 
 268. Id. at 265; Id. at 268. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id.  
 271. Id.   
 272. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). 
 273. See Minutes, supra note 26 (May, July, August, and September 1999). The 
Committee reviewed these recently and added some updates. Minutes, supra note 26 
(June 2018). 
 274. See TN. ST. §§ 39-5-501-506. Since none of the statutes proposed by the 
Committee, except for indecent exposure, are based on the Model Code, the reference 
will just be to section numbers. These may coincide with the Model Code sections, but 
this is only for the sake of consistency. 
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 After the Committee’s original adoption of its revised sex crimes 
statutes, the American Law Institute (ALI) decided to strike Article 213 of 
the Model Code and revise it.275  The Committee had presciently managed 
to avoid the main criticisms of the later stricken article by not applying sex 
crimes to a particular gender of victim or perpetrator,276 loosening the 
restrictions on the most serious forms of sexual assault,277 as well as 
limiting the marital exemption.278 
  The efforts by the ALI to revise the Model Penal Code are 
ongoing.279  The Committee reviewed the current proposals but decided that 
the version we had adopted was preferable for our purposes.280  Using 
 
 275. 2012 A.L.I. Proceedings 257. 
 276. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 277. See id. at §§ 213.1-3. 
 278. See id. at § 213.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 279. The comment accompanying the stricken article indicated that the 
criticisms included “gendered language,” “tight restrictions” on the most serious form of 
rape, designating forms of sexual conduct as “deviate,” retention of a broad marital 
exemption, “antiquated procedural provisions,” and outdated reasoning and phraseology 
in the comments. See id. at §§ 213.0-5. 
 280. Sections 213.1-5. I will cite these sections in this manner, since we did not 
take them from the Model Code, as noted above.  
 These are the definitions that the Committee adopted for § 213. They will be 
discussed as they arise in the discussion.  
 Section 213.0 Definition  
(1) “Coercion” means use of or threat of immediate or future 
kidnapping, extortion, force or violence or the use of parental, 
custodial, or other official authority over a child less than 
fifteen (15) years of age; 
(2) “Intimate” parts include the primary genital area, groin, 
inner thigh, buttock, or breast of a human being;  
(3) “Mentally incapacitated” means that at the time of the act 
the victim is incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct 
due to the mental disease or defect or the influence of a 
narcotic, anesthetic or other substance administered to him 
without his consent, or due to any other acts committed upon 
him without his consent; 
(4) “Physically helpless” means the victim is unconscious, 
asleep or for any other reason physically or verbally unable to 
communicate unwillingness to do an act; 
(5) “Sexual contact” includes the knowing touching of the 
victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, or the 
knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area 
of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, 
if that touching can be reasonably construed as being for the 
purpose of sexual arousal or the gratification; 
(6) “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, 
however, slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object 
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Mississippi statutes and looking at other states, as well as the Model Code, 
the Committee drafted statutes on rape and aggravated rape, rape of a child, 
sexual battery, and aggravated sexual battery.281  The Committee also 
adopted a version of indecent exposure based on the Model Code.  In 
addition, we adopted a limited spousal exception and revised the 
Mississippi statute on protective orders and procedure.282  We will begin 
with rape and aggravated rape.  
 
A. Section 213.1 Rape; Aggravated Rape 
 
 Traditional rape statutes allowed only for a female victim and a 
male perpetrator.283  These statutes also required that the victim show that 
she used “utmost resistance,”284 which required that the “intensity of the 
struggle must reflect the victim’s physical capacity to oppose sexual 
aggression; and that her efforts must not have abated during the 
encounter.”285  Utmost resistance would not be required if the victim was 
raped by the use of “fear of grave harm.”286  Courts often required that the 
“woman’s fear must encompass harm of extreme gravity” and that her 
reaction be reasonable.287  Essentially, the actor had to give the victim a 
reasonable belief of imminent harm.288  The Committee rejected the gender 
specific requirement and the requirement of resistance by the victim,  as 
reflected in the rape and aggravated rape statute proposed, as follows:  
 
Section 213.1 Rape and Aggravated Rape 
(1) Rape is the sexual penetration of a victim by the actor or 
of the actor by a victim when: 
 
into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the actor’s, or 
any other person’s body, but emission of semen is not required; 
and  
(7) “Spouse” means a married person. “Married Person” means 
living together when neither spouse has filed for separate 
maintenance or divorce.  
(8) “Victim” means the person alleged to have been subjected 
to criminal sexual conduct. 
 281. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018). 
 282. Id.  
 283. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). Although 
the Official Comments have been stricken by the ALI, they remain useful for historical 
purposes. See supra note 276. 
 284. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 285. Id. at 305. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 308. 
 288. Id. at 309. 
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 (a) the sexual penetration is accomplished by force 
or coercion; or  
 (b) the sexual penetration is accomplished without 
consent of the victim  and the actor knows or recklessly 
disregards that sexual penetration is  accomplished without 
the consent of the victim; or 
 (c) the victim is mentally incapacitated or physically 
helpless and the actor  knows or recklessly disregards that 
the victim is mentally incapacitated or  physically 
helpless and is incapable of consenting. 
Rape is a second-degree felony.  
(2) Aggravated rape is rape accompanied by one or more of 
the following: 
 (a) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon; or 
 (b) The actor causes bodily injury to the victim; or  
 (c) the actor is aided or abetted by one (1) or more 
persons; or  
 (d) the victim is less than sixteen (16) years old. 
Aggravated Rape is a first-degree felony.289   
 
 Rape is sexual penetration without consent, by coercion, or if the 
victim is physically helpless or mentally incapacitated.  The important 
terms are defined in the Committee’s version of Section 213.0.290  “Sexual 
penetration means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal 
intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s 
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the 
actor’s, or any other person’s body, but emission of semen is not 
required.”291  With regard to sexual penetration accomplished by coercion, 
that term is defined in the Committee’s version of Section 213.0(1) as “use 
of or threat of immediate or future kidnapping, extortion, force or violence 
or the use of parental, custodial, or other official authority over a child less 
than fifteen (15) years of age.”292  The Committee decided to eliminate 
“force” from the statute and leave “force” in the definition of coercion.  The 
word “force” in the statute could mean slight force, which should be 
insufficient to be a serious crime.  In context of the definition, sandwiched 
 
 289. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018). 
 290. See supra note 281.  
 291. Id.  
 292. Id. 
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as it is between threat of a serious felony or violence, force would indicate 
something more serious.293  
 If the sexual penetration is accomplished without consent or the 
victim is physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, the actor must have 
knowledge or be reckless in believing that the victim was consenting under 
such circumstances.294  Knowledge would require that the person be aware 
that the victim is not consenting.295  Recklessness would only require the 
actor to be consciously aware of a substantial risk that the victim is not 
consenting.296  “Physically helpless” applies to the situation in which the 
victim is unconscious or otherwise physically helpless or unable to 
communicate.297  “Mentally incapacitated”  applies to the situation in which 
the actor administers a drug or other substance against the victim’s will that 
renders him incapable of consenting or in the case of mental disease or 
defect.298  Obviously there is some overlap among these categories, but the 
Committee thought that these were the situations in which culpability is 
 
 293. The doctrine of ejusdem generis would apply here. Ejusdem generis is “a 
canon of construction that holds that when a general term follows a list of particular 
terms, the general terms only applies to things similar.” 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ejusdem_generis. 
 294. Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2018).  
 295. The Committee adopted Model Code’s § 2.02 defining knowledge and 
recklessness is as follows:  
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a 
material element of an offense when: 
 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the 
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of 
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is 
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will 
cause such a result. 
(c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a 
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element 
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such 
a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of 
the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s 
situation. 
Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2018). See Johnson, supra note 2, at V. A. 1. 
 296. Id. 
 297. See supra note 281. 
 298. Id. 
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most serious.  The final definition clarifies that “victim means the person 
alleged to have been subjected to criminal sexual conduct.”299 
 Aggravated rape is elevated to a felony in the first degree and occurs 
when the actor uses a deadly weapon, causes bodily injury, is aided by 
another person, or when the victim is younger than sixteen years old.300  
“Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition.”301  “Deadly weapon” is defined as “any firearm or 
other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate 
or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is 
capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”302  The Committee 
believed that precise definitions were especially important since 
Mississippi lacks crucial definitions in this difficult area.303   
  The oldest Mississippi statute on rape is termed “Rape; Assault 
with Intent to Ravish,” and it requires, among other things, that the victim 
be of chaste character, so it has fallen out of use.  This statute also only 
applies to female victims.304  The statute does have the advantage of a stated 
mens rea, which none of the other Mississippi statutes expressly have.305  
This statute should be repealed by Section 213.1, among others.306 
  The Mississippi statute that covers statutory rape also includes a 
section that prohibits forcible sexual intercourse with any person, which 
includes administering a substance to cause the person to be unable to 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. Section 213.1. 
 301. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).  
 302. See supra note 72. 
 303. See Appendix E.  There is a definition section, but it does not include many 
of the relevant terms.  
 304. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-71. 
 305. See statutes listed in Appendix E. 
 306. See id. 
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resist.307  This statute provides for a life sentence.308  This part of the statute, 
as noted in common with the other Mississippi statutes on sex crimes, 
suffers from having no mens rea requirement.309  In addition there is no 
definition of “forcible,” so the force could be anything from slight to 
requiring “utmost resistance.”310  This statute should also be repealed by 
the rape statutes proposed by the Committee.311  The remainder of the 
statutory rape statute would be repealed by the following proposed 
section.312  
 
C.  Rape of a Child 
 
Under the common law, it was illegal to have sex with someone ten 
years of age or younger.  Most statutory schemes consider sex with a child 
a heinous crime and punish it more severely than rape of a mature person.313  
The age cut-off for statutory rape varies from state to state.314  Many states 
graduate punishment according to the age of the victim.315  The original 
 
 307. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95. 
In addition, the following subsection of MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-6597-3-65 also covers 
forcible sexual intercourse: 
(4)  (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse 
with any person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not 
constituting forcible sexual intercourse or statutory rape with 
any person without that person's consent by administering to 
such person any substance or liquid which shall produce such 
stupor or such imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to 
prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, shall be 
imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its 
verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the 
penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at 
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the 
court, in its discretion, may determine. 
 308. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65. See infra note 318 for the complete statute. 
 309. See infra statutes cited in Appendix E. 
 310. See supra discussion accompanying notes 287-89. The caselaw does not 
appear to have defined “forcible” either. See, e.g. Madere v. State, 794 So. 2d 200, p.cite 
(2001), in which the court said: 
People of ordinary intelligence have the ability to understand 
what behavior “forcible sexual intercourse” is designed to 
discourage. The word “forcible” is no more vague or overly 
broad than “forcibly ravish.” We find that the statutory 
purpose and meaning of the amended statute, § 97–3–65(3)(a) 
(2000), is purely common sense to any reasonable person.   
 311. See Appendix E. 
 312. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65. 
 313. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 324 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 325. 
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version of the Model Code provided for strict liability in the case of children 
under the age of ten but modified this position in the case of older 
children.316  The Committee basically followed this approach but thought 
that under eleven years old was more appropriate for strict liability.  The 
Committee adopted the following statute that would replace statutory rape 
under the Mississippi Code:317  
 
 316. Id. at 326. 
 317. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65.  
Statutory rape; enhanced penalty for forcible sexual intercourse or 
statutory rape by administering certain substances; criminal sexual assault 
protection order 
(1) The crime of statutory rape is committed when: 
(a) Any person seventeen (17) years of age or older has sexual 
intercourse with a child who: 
(i) Is at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of 
age; 
(ii) Is thirty-six (36) or more months younger than the 
person; and 
  (iii) Is not the person's spouse; or 
(b) A person of any age has sexual intercourse with a child who: 
  (i) Is under the age of fourteen (14) years; 
(ii) Is twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the 
person; and 
  (iii) Is not the person's spouse. 
(2) Neither the victim's consent nor the victim's lack of chastity is a 
defense to a charge of statutory rape. 
(3) Upon conviction for statutory rape, the defendant shall be sentenced as 
follows: 
(a) If eighteen (18) years of age or older, but under twenty-one (21) 
years of age, and convicted under subsection (1) (a) of this section, to 
imprisonment for not more than five (5) years in the State Penitentiary 
or a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($ 5,000.00), or 
both; 
(b) If twenty-one (21) years of age or older and convicted under 
subsection (1)(a) of this section, to imprisonment of not more than 
thirty (30) years in the State Penitentiary or a fine of not more than 
Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), or both, for the first offense, and 
not more than forty (40) years in the State Penitentiary for each 
subsequent offense; 
(c) If eighteen (18) years of age or older and convicted under 
subsection (1)(b) of this section, to imprisonment for life in the State 
Penitentiary or such lesser term of imprisonment as the court may 
determine, but not less than twenty (20) years; 
(d) If thirteen (13) years of age or older but under eighteen (18) years 
of age and convicted under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section, 
such imprisonment, fine or other sentence as the court, in its 
discretion, may determine. 
(4) (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any 
person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible 
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sexual intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that 
person’s consent by administering to such person any substance or 
liquid which shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or 
weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, 
shall be  imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its 
verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the 
penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at 
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the court, in its 
discretion, may determine. 
(b) This subsection (4) shall apply whether the perpetrator is married 
to the victim or not. 
(5) In all cases where a victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years, it 
shall not be necessary to prove penetration where it is shown the genitals, 
anus or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to 
have sexual intercourse with the child. 
(6) (a) Upon conviction under this section, the court may issue a criminal 
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any 
contact with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the 
victim and offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual 
assault protection order any relief available under Section 93-21-15. 
The term of a criminal sexual assault protection order shall be for a 
time period determined by the court, but all orders shall, at a 
minimum, remain in effect for a period of two (2) years after the 
expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and subsequent period of 
community supervision, conditional release, probation, or parole. 
Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection order, the four 
(24) hours of issuance, with no exceptions for weekends or holidays as 
provided in Section 93-21-25, and a copy must be provided to both the 
victim and offender. 
(b) Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the 
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General. 
(c) It is a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a 
criminal sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a 
violation, the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail 
for not more than six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for 
the violation of a criminal sexual assault protection order shall run 
consecutively to any other sentences imposed on the offender. The 
court shall also be empowered to extend the criminal sexual assault 
protection order for a period of one (1) year for each violation. The 
incarceration of a person at the time of the violation is not a bar to 
prosecution under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall be 
construed to prohibit the imposition of any other penalties or 
disciplinary action otherwise allowed by law or policy. 
(7) For the purposes of this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean a 
joining of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which 
the penis of the male is inserted into the vagina of the female or the 
penetration of the sexual organs of a male or female human being in which 
the penis or an object is inserted into the genitals, anus or perineum of a 
male or female. 
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Section 213.2 Rape of a Child 
(1)(a) Sexual penetration of the victim by the actor or of 
the actor by the victim  when the victim is less than 
eleven (11) years old and the actor is at least  sixteen 
(16) years old  is a first degree felony. Mistake as to the 
victim’s age  is no defense. 
 (b) Sexual penetration of the victim’s body by the 
actor or of the actor by  the victim when the victim is 
less than eleven (11) years old and the actor  is less than 
sixteen (16) years old is a second degree felony. Mistake as 
to  the victim’s age is no defense. 
(2) Sexual penetration of the victim by the actor or of 
the actor by the victim when the victim is at least eleven (11) 
years old but less than sixteen (16) years old and the actor is 
at least four years older than the victim is a second degree 
felony. It is a defense that the actor neither knew nor 
recklessly disregarded that the victim was less than sixteen 
(16) years old. Mistake as to the victim’s age is a defense 
under this subsection (2).  
(3) Sexual penetration of the victim by the actor or of 
the actor by the victim is a third-degree felony when the 
victim is at least eleven (11) years old but less than sixteen 
(16) years old, and the actor is less than 21 years old but at 
least four (4) years older than the victim. It is a defense that 
the actor neither knew nor recklessly disregarded that the 
victim was less than 16 years old. Mistake as to the victim’s 
age is a defense under this subsection (3). 
(4) A person does not commit an offense under this 
section if the victim is the spouse of the actor.318  
 
 The Committee was concerned about the across-the-board strict 
liability imposed by the Mississippi statute, as well as the narrow age 
difference required between the actor and the victim.319  The proposed 
statute addresses these concerns by limiting the imposition of strict liability 
to rape of a child under eleven.  Thus, mistake of age is no defense if the 
child is less than eleven, while mistake of age is a defense if the child is at 
least eleven.  The Committee thought it was highly unlikely that a child 
under eleven could ever be mistaken for anything but a child.  If the actor 
 
See Alexandra Hutton Oglesby, Eliminating Injustice: Revising Mississippi's Statutory 
Rape Laws, 76 MISS. L.J. 1067 (2007), for a criticism of the law. 
 318. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018). 
 319. Id.  
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is less than sixteen, the offense is a second-degree felony, otherwise it is a 
first-degree felony.320  
 The proposed statute on rape of a child requires that the actor must 
be at least four years older than the victim.321  The current Mississippi 
statute has only a three-year age difference,322 which could apply to 
students only separated by two or three grades in the same school.  Under 
the proposed statute, if the victim is between eleven and sixteen, the actor 
must either know or recklessly disregard the victim’s age.323  Again, rape 
is defined as sexual penetration by the actor of the victim or the victim by 
the actor.324  This conduct is punished as a second-degree felony or third-
degree felony if the actor is younger than twenty-one.325  
 The Committee was aware that there are marriages where the ages 
of the victim and actor are within the statute.  Thus, if the victim is the 
spouse of the actor, there is no offense under this statute.326  However, the 
Committee adopted a statute with a limited spousal immunity, which allows 
for prosecution of spouses for rape under more conditions than the current 
Mississippi spousal exemption.327   
  
C. Section 213.4 Limited Spousal Exclusion; Spousal Rape 
 
 The common law recognized a spousal exclusion from rape, so that 
a man could not be guilty of raping his wife.328  The basis for this exemption 
was the historical treatment of women, especially wives, as chattels.329  
Although the latter idea was eventually abandoned, nevertheless, there was 
a belief that marriage constituted “a blanket consent to intimacy which the 
woman may revoke only by dissolving the marital relationship.”330  Today, 
marriage is viewed as an equal relationship that should always only require 
consensual sex.331  The Committee adopted the following limited spousal 
exclusion, which is presented out of order, since it is an exemption to the 
rape statutes just discussed: 
 
 
 320. Compare MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 with proposed § 213.2.  
 321. Id. 
 322. MISS. CODE ANN. Section 97-3-65. 
 323. Section 213.2(1).   
 324. Id.  
 325. Id. 
 326. Section 213.2(4). 
 327. Section 213.4.  
 328. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 341 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 329. Id. at 343. 
 330. Id. at 342. 
 331. Id. at 345. 
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Section 213.4 Limited Spousal Exclusion; Spousal Rape 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person does not 
commit an offense under this Article if the victim is the 
spouse of the actor.  
(2) Spousal rape is sexual penetration of one spouse by the 
other when: 
 (a) Sexual penetration is accomplished by coercion 
or knowingly without  the consent of the victim; or 
 (b) The actor causes serious bodily injury to the 
victim or sexual  penetration is accomplished by the 
use or threatened use of a deadly  weapon.  
Spousal rape under section (2)(a) is a second-degree felony. 
Spousal rape under section (2)(b) is a first-degree felony.332  
 
 The Committee decided to maintain a spousal exception but limited 
it.  The concern is that allegation of this crime could be used as leverage in 
divorce actions, so that rape is only an offense if the actor’s state of mind 
is more culpable.  Thus, spousal rape under section (2)(a) may be charged 
when the actor knows that the sexual penetration is without consent or is 
accomplished by coercion.333  Knowledge requires the actor to be 
consciously aware that the victim is not consenting.334  
 Under the rape statute, section 213.1, the actor must only be reckless 
with regard to  whether the victim is consenting.335  The only difference for 
spousal rape is that the actor must be practically certain that the spouse is 
not consenting, as opposed to being aware of a substantial risk that the 
spouse is not consenting.336  Spousal rape under this subsection is a second 
degree felony, as is rape under Section 213.1.337  Under subsection (2)(b), 
if the sexual penetration causes bodily injury or is accomplished with a 
deadly weapon, there is no spousal exemption, and spousal rape is a first 
degree felony as it is under Section 213.1.338 
Mississippi currently has an apparently very limited general spousal 
rape exclusion, which seems to adhere to the outdated view that marriage 
includes consent to sex for purposes of rape and sexual battery and is even 
named “Defense of Marriage.”  The exclusion does not apply if the spouses 
 
 332. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018). 
 333. Section 213.4. 
 334. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); discussion 
accompanying note 296. 
 335. Section 213.1.  
 336. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) with § 2.02(2)(c) (AM LAW 
INST. 1985). 
 337. Compare § 213.1(1) with § 213.4(1).  
 338. Compare § 213.1(2) with § 213.4(2). 
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are separated at the time.339  However, there are two important exceptions 
that ameliorate the effect of the exclusion.  The most important one is in the 
“Defense of Marriage” statute, which provides that “the legal spouse of the 
alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery if the legal spouse is 
engaged in forcible sexual penetration without the consent of the alleged 
victim.”340  In addition, the exclusion does not apply to forcible sexual 
intercourse or administration of a substance rendering the victim helpless, 
even if the victim and actor are married, which is contained in another 
section.341  The effect of these two sections together makes a distinction 
between forcible sexual penetration and sexual penetration merely without 
consent.  Since there is no clear definition of forcible sexual penetration and 
no mens rea stated for when the sexual penetration is without consent, it is 
difficult to predict when the exemption will apply.342   
The Mississippi marital exclusion applies to sexual battery as well, 
except as indicated.  Since the Mississippi sexual battery statute requires 
sexual penetration, the exemption works out to apply only to cases of actual 
sexual penetration.343  Sexual battery as proposed by the Committee would 
cover other cases of sexual assault, while the proposed rape statute applies 
 
 339. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-99.  
Sexual battery, defense of marriage 
A person is not guilty of any offense under Sections 97-3-95 [95 sexual 
battery; 97 definitions;101 punishment and protective orders] through 97-3-
103 {other statutes unaffected] if the alleged victim is that person's legal 
spouse and at the time of the alleged offense such person and the alleged 
victim are not separated and living apart; provided, however, that the legal 
spouse of the alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery if the 
legal spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration without the consent of 
the alleged victim. 
 340. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-99.  
 341. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-65. 
(4) (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any 
person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible 
sexual intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that 
person's consent by administering to such person any substance or 
liquid which shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or 
weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, 
shall be  imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its 
verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty 
at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in 
the State Penitentiary for any term as the court, in its discretion, may 
determine. 
 (b) This subsection (4) shall apply whether the perpetrator is married to 
 the victim or not. 
 342. See supra note 342. 
 343. See id; supra discussion accompanying notes 340-43. 
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only to sexual penetration.344  The Committee chose to apply Section 213.4, 
the marital exemption, only to rape and not to sexual battery, which has its 
own exemption for simple sexual battery but not for aggravated sexual 
battery.345   
 
D. Section 213.3 Sexual Battery; Aggravated Sexual Battery 
 
The Committee is proposing the following statute to cover sexual 
contact not amounting to sexual penetration: 
 
Section 213.3 Sexual Battery; Aggravated Sexual Battery 
(1) Sexual battery is sexual contact of a victim by the actor 
or of the actor by a victim if:  
 (a) The sexual contact is accomplished by force or 
coercion or the actor’s  fraudulent misrepresentation 
that the parties are legally married; or  
 (b) The sexual contact is accomplished without 
consent of the victim, and  the actor knows or recklessly 
disregards that the sexual contact is  accomplished without 
the consent of the victim; or 
 (c) The victim is mentally incapacitated or 
physically helpless, and the  actor knows or recklessly 
disregards that the victim is mentally  incapacitated 
or physically helpless; or  
 (d) The victim is less than eighteen (18) years of age, 
and the actor used  his supervisory, disciplinary, 
custodial, or parental authority to accomplish  the 
sexual contact.  
 (e) A person does not commit an offense under this 
subsection if the  victim is the spouse of the actor.  
Sexual battery is a felony in the fourth degree.  
(2) Aggravated sexual battery is sexual battery accompanied 
by one or more of the following: 
(a) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon; or 
(b) The actor causes bodily injury to the victim; or 
(c) The actor is aided or abetted by one (1) or more 
persons; or 
(d) The victim is less than sixteen (16) years old.  
 
 344. Compare § 213.1 with § 213.3. 
 345. See § 213.3(1). 
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Aggravated sexual battery is a felony in the second 
degree.346  
  
 Sexual battery was patterned after the rape statute to cover sexual 
assault in cases in which there is no sexual penetration.347  “‘Sexual contact’ 
includes the knowing touching of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other 
person’s intimate parts, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering 
the immediate area of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s 
intimate parts, if that touching can be reasonably construed as being for the 
purpose of sexual arousal or the gratification.”348  As noted earlier, 
Mississippi applies sexual battery only to actual penetration.349  With the 
exception of a child fondling statute,350 there is no statute in Mississippi 
that punishes sexual assault when there is no penetration.  This conduct 
would not be punished under the assault statute because even simple assault 
requires bodily injury, not just offensive touching.351  Bodily injury is 
defined under the Model Code as “physical pain, illness or any impairment 
of physical condition.”352  The term is not defined under the Mississippi 
Code, which otherwise adopted the language of simple assault from the 
Model Code, including bodily injury.353  The Committee believed that 
sexual assault, even without penetration, may be just as traumatizing as 
sexual penetration and that such assaults should be seriously punished.  
There have been bills introduced in the Mississippi legislature to punish 
sexual assault, but none has passed.354 
 
 346. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018). 
 347. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018). 
 348. See supra note 281. This is contrasted with sexual penetration, which 
“means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, 
however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal 
openings of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s body, but emission of semen 
is not required.” See id. This definition is essentially the same as the Mississippi 
definition of sexual penetration, but the latter only applies to another person, not to 
sexual penetration of the actor himself. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-97(a). 
 349. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-95. 
 350. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-23. 
 351. See supra note 50. 
 352. See supra note 72. 
 353. See supra note 53. 
 354. Conversation with Caryn Quilter, Staff Attorney, Mississippi State Senate 
for almost 30 years. She has been a valuable member of the Committee for almost as 
many years. The following are the bills proposed, all of which died in committee: See 
H.B 221, 271,1020; S.B. 2420 (2019); H.B. 195, 922; S.B 2273 (2018); H.B. 1368,1382; 
S.B. 2900 (2017); H.B. 563, 579; S.B. 2766 (2016); S.B.2094 (2015); H.B. 1058; S.B. 
2219 (2013); S.B. 2078 (2012); S.B. 2327, 2525 (2011); H.B. 28; S.B. 2340; S.B. 2715 
(2007); S.B.2253 (2009); S.B. 2226 (2008); S.B. 2460 (2006).  
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 Non-aggravated sexual battery, or simple sexual battery, is a felony 
in the fourth degree.355  Such sexual battery is sexual contact by the actor 
or actor by the victim.356  There are four situations that may be sexual 
battery.  The first prohibits sexual contact by coercion or fraudulent 
representation of marriage.357  The second addresses sexual contact without 
consent of the victim when the actor recklessly disregards the victim’s 
consent. 358  The third applies when the actor recklessly disregards that the 
victim is mentally or physically incapacitated.359  The fourth situation is 
when the victim is less than eighteen, and the actor used his supervisory 
authority to accomplish the sexual contact.360  There is a spousal exemption 
for simple sexual battery,361 but not for aggravated sexual battery.362  
 Aggravated sexual battery is a felony in the second degree and 
occurs when the actor is armed with a deadly weapon, causes bodily injury 
to the victim, is aided by another or the victim is less than sixteen years 
old.363  Again, “bodily injury” under the Model Code is defined as “physical 
pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.”364 
The Committee also drafted a new statute to add the procedure from 
the current Mississippi Statutes on rape and sexual battery.365  The 
procedure was taken from the current Mississippi statute, section 97-3-101, 
but was conformed to the proposed statutory scheme.366  We are 
recommending that the remainder of the statute be eliminated and replaced 
by the foregoing.  
 The Committee did adopt one of the Model Code’s sex crimes 
statutes to cover indecent exposure, revising the statute with the needs of 




 355. Section 213.3. 
 356. Section 213.3. 
 357. Section 213.3(1)(a). 
 358. Section 213(1)(b). 
 359. Section 213(1)(c). 
 360. Section 213(1)(d). 
 361. Section 213.3(1)(e). 
 362. Section 213.3(2).  
 363. Section 213.1(b). 
 364. Section 213.0(2). 
§ 213.0. Definitions 
In this Article, the definitions given in § 210.0 apply unless a different meaning plainly is 
required. 
These definitions are set out in an earlier footnote. See supra note 72. 
 365. See Appendix B. 
 366. Section 213.5 Protective orders; Procedure for introducing evidence of 
sexual conduct of complaining witness; “complaining witness” defined. 
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E. Section 213.5 Indecent Exposure 
 
The Committee adopted the following statute on indecent exposure:  
 
Section 213.5 Indecent Exposure 
(1) A person commits the offense of indecent exposure if, 
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of 
himself or of any other person, he exposes his genitals under 
circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to 
cause affront or fear alarm. 
A first or second conviction of section (1) is a Class B 
misdemeanor.  A third or subsequent conviction of section 
(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person commits the offense of indecent exposure to a 
child if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 
desire of himself or of any other person, he exposes his 
genitals to a person known to be under sixteen years of age 
under circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely 
to cause affront or alarm. 
A first conviction of section (2) is a Class A misdemeanor.  
A second or subsequent conviction of section 215.5 is a 
Fourth Degree Felony.367 
  
 The Model Code’s version of indecent exposure deals with one who 
displays his genitals in circumstances known to carry risk of affront or fear 
“for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.”368  The Committee 
decided to substitute the word “alarm” for “fear.”369  Another offense, 
“open lewdness,” addresses the situation in which an actor may lack a 
purpose to arouse or gratify sexual desire and yet engage in objectively 
lewd display that shocks or outrages observers.370  Open lewdness under 
section 251.1 is a Class D misdemeanor and will be discussed in a future 
article on crimes against public decency.  
Indecent exposure is a type of sexual assault and is a Class B 
misdemeanor for a first or second offense, except in the case of a victim 
known to be under sixteen.  The Committee decided that a subsequent 
offense should be a Class A misdemeanor.  We also added a subsection that 
would punish the first indecent exposure to a child known to be under 
 
 367. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020).  
 368. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 369. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020). 
 370. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
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sixteen as a Class A misdemeanor.  Subsequent such offenses would be 
fourth-degree felonies.371 
Indecent exposure requires exhibition of the genitals.  Display of 
buttocks or breast is not covered.372  The Code provision requires that the 
actor have a purpose to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of himself or of 
another who is not his spouse.  We left out the reference to a spouse because 
we thought purpose to affront or alarm would be sufficient to criminalize 
the exposure regardless of who the person was.373 
The requirement of sexual gratification would exclude prankster 
exhibitionism. Such conduct may be punished as “open lewdness” under 
section 251.1.374  Indecent exposure requires that the actor know that his 
conduct is likely to cause alarm.  Thus, nudists and exotic dancers would 
not be covered.375 
 Section 215.5 defines indecent exposure more narrowly than prior 
statutes.  For example one of the Mississippi statutes prohibits “willfully 
and lewdly” exposing ones person, or private parts.376  Another statute 
prohibits “indecent exposure of his or her person,” as well as abusive 
language in or near the dwelling of another.377  Both statutes must be 
 
 371. Id. 
 372. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 410 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 373. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020). 
 374. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 410 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 375. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 407 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
 376. MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 97-29-31. Indecent exposure 
A person who willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or 
private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place 
where others are present, or procures another to so expose 
himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction for a 
first offense, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding 
six (6) months, or both. Upon conviction for a second offense 
within five (5) years, such person shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or shall be imprisoned not 
exceeding one (1) year, or both. Upon conviction of a third or 
subsequent offense within five (5) years, such person shall be 
guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or shall be 
imprisoned for not more than five (5) years in the State 
Penitentiary, or both. It is not a violation of this statute for a 
woman to breast-feed. 
 377. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-11.  
Disturbance by abusive language or indecent exposure 
Any person who enters the dwelling house of another, or the 
yard or curtilage thereof, or upon the public highway, or any 
other place near such premises, and in the presence or hearing 
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intended to cover breast exposure because they both exclude breast 
feeding.378  The rationale for limiting the coverage to genitalia in the 
proposed statute is to limit the offense to “visual sexual aggression against 
the unwilling viewer.”379  This would exclude private conduct that is 
conducted without “due regard to privacy.”380  This section is intended to 
prohibit intentional sexual exposure for sexual gratification, which is 




 As have other states and the federal government, Mississippi has 
recognized the need for criminal justice reform.382  As part of this effort, 
the criminal code should be updated and improved.  Mississippi has been 
justifiably criticized for its criminal laws,383 but this should not be the main 
impetus for this effort to revise the penal code.  In the interests of justice 
and fairness, the conduct prohibited by the criminal law should be clearly 
defined with appropriate requirements for mens rea.  Also important is that 
the punishment should be more carefully related to the seriousness of the 
crime.  The Committee has attempted to propose new laws that are designed 
to serve the goals and the interests of our state.384   
 The first article, inter alia, explained the proposals for homicide 
crimes against the person.385  This article has explained the proposals for 
non-homicide crimes against the person.   Other than the homicide crimes, 
there is no area that requires clarity and definition more than this one, which 
includes assault and battery, kidnapping, and sex crimes.  The current 
versions of these in the Mississippi Code often lack any mens rea 
requirement or definition of important terms.386  Adoption of the 
Committee’s proposals will supply these crucial elements.  
 
of the family or the possessor or occupant thereof, or of any 
member thereof, makes use of abusive, profane, vulgar or 
indecent language, or is guilty of any indecent exposure of his 
or her person at such place, shall be punished for a 
misdemeanor. The act of breast-feeding shall not constitute 
indecent exposure. 
This statute would also be repealed by Art. 213. 
 378. Id. 
 379. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 408 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
 380. Id.  
  381. Id. at 410.  
 382. H.B. 1352 (2019). 
 383. See supra discussion accompanying notes 3-6. 
 384. See Johnson, supra note 2, at IV. 
 385. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V. B. 
 386. See Appendix C, D and E. 
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Appendix A 
 
Domestic Violence Statute Proposed: 
 
Section 211.X Domestic Violence 
 
(1) A person shall be guilty of domestic violence when the offense is 
committed against a current or former spouse of the defendant or a child of 
that person, a person living as a spouse or who formerly lived as a spouse 
with the defendant or a child of that person, a parent, grandparent, child, 
grandchild or someone similarly situated to the defendant, a person who has 
a current or former dating relationship with the defendant, or a person with 
whom the defendant has had a biological or legally adopted child. 
 
(2) A person is guilty of simple domestic violence if he: 
 
(i)  Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another; 
 
(ii)  Criminally negligently causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious 
bodily harm; or 
 
(iii)  Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of 
imminent serious bodily harm. 
 
The offense is a Class A misdemeanor, except that it is Felony in 
the Fourth degree if at the time of the commission of the offense in 
question, he has two (2) prior convictions, whether against the same 
or another victim, within seven (7) years, for any combination of 
simple domestic violence under this subsection (2) or aggravated 
domestic violence as defined in subsection (3) of this section or 
substantially similar offenses under the law of another state, of the 
United States, or of a federally recognized Native American tribe.  
 
(3) A person is guilty of aggravated domestic violence if he: 
 
(i)  Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes 
such an injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life; 
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(ii)  Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to 
produce death or serious bodily harm. 
 
The offense is a Felony in the Fourth Degree, except that  
 
(i)  the offense is a felony in the third degree if at the time of 
the commission of the offense, he has two (2) prior convictions 
within the past seven (7) years, whether against the same or 
another victim, for any combination of aggravated domestic 
violence under this subsection or simple domestic violence, 
which is defined as a felony in the fourth degree, as set forth in 
Subsection (2) or substantially similar offenses under the laws 
of another state, of the United States, or of a federally 
recognized Native American tribe.  
 
(ii)  the offense is a felony in the second degree if has at least 
three (3) previous convictions, whether against the same or 
different victims, for any combination of offenses defined in 
subsection (3) of this section or substantially similar offenses 
under the law of another state, of the United States, or of a 
federally recognized Native American tribe.  
 
(4) Reasonable discipline of a child, such as spanking, is not an offense 
under this section. 
 
(5)  A person convicted under subsection (3) of this section shall not be 
eligible for parole under the provisions of Section 47-7-3(1)(c) until he shall 
have served one (1) year of his sentence. 
 
(6)  For the purposes of this section, “Dating relationship” means a social 
relationship as defined in Section 93-21-3. 
 
(7)  Every conviction under subsection (3) of this section may require as a 
condition of any suspended sentence that the defendant participate in 
counseling or treatment to bring about the cessation of domestic abuse. The 
defendant may be required to pay all or part of the cost of the counseling or 
treatment, in the discretion of the court. 
 
(8) (a) Upon conviction under subsection (3) of this section, the court shall 
be empowered to issue a criminal protection order prohibiting the defendant 
from any contact with the victim. The court may include in a criminal 
protection order any other condition available under Section 93-21-15. The 
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duration of a criminal protection order shall be based upon the seriousness 
of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the 
continued safety of the victim or another person. However, municipal and 
justice courts may issue criminal protection orders for a maximum period 
of time not to exceed one (1) year. Circuit and county courts may issue a 
criminal protection order for any period of time deemed necessary. Upon 
issuance of a criminal protection order, the clerk of the issuing court shall 
enter the order in the Mississippi Protection Order Registry within twenty-
four (24) hours of issuance with no exceptions for weekends or holidays, 
pursuant to Section 93-21-25. 
 
(b)  A criminal protection order shall not be issued against the defendant if 
the victim of the offense, or the victim's lawful representative where the 
victim is a minor or incompetent person, objects to its issuance, except in 
circumstances where the court, in its discretion, finds that a criminal 
protection order is necessary for the safety and well-being of a victim who 
is a minor child or incompetent adult. 
 
(c)  Criminal protection orders shall be issued on the standardized form 
developed by the Office of the Attorney General and a copy provided to 
both the victim and the defendant. 
 
(d)  It shall be a Class B misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition 
of a criminal protection order.  
 
(9)  When investigating allegations of a violation of subsection (3) of this 
section, whether or not an arrest results, law enforcement officers shall 
utilize the form prescribed for such purposes by the Office of the Attorney 
General in consultation with the sheriff’s and police chief’s associations. 
However, failure of law enforcement to utilize the uniform offense report 
shall not be a defense to a crime charged under this section. The uniform 
offense report shall not be required if, upon investigation, the offense does 
not involve persons in the relationships specified in subsections (1) of this 
section. 
 
(10)  In any conviction under subsection (3) of this section, the sentencing 
order shall include the designation “domestic violence.” The court clerk 
shall enter the disposition of the matter into the corresponding uniform 
offense report. 
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Appendix B 
 
Protective Orders and Procedure Statute Proposed: 
 
Section 213.5 Protective orders; Procedure for introducing evidence of 
sexual conduct of complaining witness; “complaining witness” defined 
 
(1) (a) Upon conviction section 213.1-4, the court may issue a criminal 
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any contact 
with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the victim and 
offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual assault protection 
order any relief available under Section 93-21-15. The term of a criminal 
sexual assault protection order shall be for a time period determined by the 
court, but all orders shall, at a minimum, remain in effect for a period of 
two (2) years after the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and 
subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release, 
probation, or parole. Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection 
order, the clerk of the issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi 
Protection Order Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance, with 
no exceptions for weekends or holidays as provided in Section 93-21-25, 
and a copy must be provided to both the victim and offender. 
 
(b)  Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the 
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General. 
 
(c)  It is a Class B misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a 
criminal sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a violation, 
the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred 
Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 
six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for the violation of a 
criminal sexual assault protection order shall run consecutively to any other 
sentences imposed on the offender. The court shall also be empowered to 
extend the criminal sexual assault protection order for a period of one (1) 
year for each violation. The incarceration of a person at the time of the 
violation is not a bar to prosecution under this section. Nothing in this 
subsection shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of any other 
penalties or disciplinary action otherwise allowed by law or policy. 
 
(2)  In any prosecution under Sections 213.1-4, for rape under Section 97-
3-65, former 97-3-67 or 97-3-71, if evidence of sexual conduct of the 
complaining witness is offered to attack the credibility of said complaining 
witness, the following procedure shall be followed: 
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(a)  A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court 
and prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the 
relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining 
witness proposed to be presented and its relevancy in attacking the 
credibility of the complaining witness. 
 
(b)  The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in 
which the offer of proof shall be stated. 
 
(c)  If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court 
shall order a closed hearing in chambers, out of the presence of the 
jury, if any, and at such closed hearing allow the questioning of the 
complaining witness regarding the offer of proof made by the 
defendant. 
 
(d)  At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence 
proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the sexual 
conduct of the complaining witness is relevant and otherwise 
admissible, the court may make an order stating what evidence may 
be introduced by the defendant, and the nature of the questions to 
be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the 
order of the court. 
 
(3)  As used in this section and Section 97-3-70 [Repealed], “complaining 
witness” means the alleged victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of 
which is subject to this section. 
 
(4)   In all cases where a victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years, it 
shall not be necessary to prove penetration where it is shown the genitals, 
anus or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to 
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Appendix C 
 
Mississippi Assault Statutes That Would Be Repealed: 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 Simple assault; aggravated assault; simple 
domestic violence; simple domestic violence third; aggravated domestic 
violence; aggravated domestic violence third 
(1)  (a) A person is guilty of simple assault if he (i) attempts to cause or 
purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (ii) 
negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other 
means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; or (iii) attempts by 
physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; 
and, upon conviction, he shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five 
Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not 
more than six (6) months, or both. 
(b)  However, a person convicted of simple assault upon any 
of the persons listed in subsection (14) of this section under the 
circumstances enumerated in subsection (14) shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($ 1,000.00) 
or by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both. 
 
(2)  (a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (i) attempts to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly 
or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life; (ii) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes 
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to 
produce death or serious bodily harm; or (iii) causes any injury to a child 
who is in the process of boarding or exiting a school bus in the course of a 
violation of Section 63-3-615; and, upon conviction, he shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or in the 
Penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years. 
(b)  However, a person convicted of aggravated assault upon 
any of the persons listed in subsection (14) of this section under 
the circumstances enumerated in subsection (14) shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($ 
5,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) 
years, or both. 
 
(3)  (a)  When the offense is committed against a current or former spouse 
of the defendant or a child of that person, a person living as a spouse or who 
formerly lived as a spouse with the defendant or a child of that person, a 
parent, grandparent, child, grandchild or someone similarly situated to the 
defendant, a person who has a current or former dating relationship with 
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the defendant, or a person with whom the defendant has had a biological or 
legally adopted child, a person is guilty of simple domestic violence who: 
 
(i)  Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another; 
 
(ii)  Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily 
harm; or 
 
(iii)  Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of 
imminent serious bodily harm. 
 
Upon conviction, the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not 
more than Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in 
the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or both. 
 
(b)  Simple domestic violence: third.  A person is guilty of 
the felony of simple domestic violence third who commits 
simple domestic violence as defined in this subsection (3) 
and who, at the time of the commission of the offense in 
question, has two (2) prior convictions, whether against 
the same or another victim, within seven (7) years, for any 
combination of simple domestic violence under this 
subsection (3) or aggravated domestic violence as defined 
in subsection (4) of this section or substantially similar 
offenses under the law of another state, of the United 
States, or of a federally recognized Native American tribe. 
Upon conviction, the defendant shall be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment not less than five (5) nor more than 
ten (10) years. 
 
(4)  (a) When the offense is committed against a current or former spouse 
of the defendant or a child of that person, a person living as a spouse or who 
formerly lived as a spouse with the defendant or a child of that person, a 
parent, grandparent, child, grandchild or someone similarly situated to the 
defendant, a person who has a current or former dating relationship with 
the defendant, or a person with whom the defendant has had a biological or 
legally adopted child, a person is guilty of aggravated domestic violence 
who: 
 
(i)  Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes 
such an injury purposely,  knowingly or recklessly under 
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circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life; 
(ii)  Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to 
produce death or serious bodily harm; or 
 
(iii)  Strangles, or attempts to strangle another. 
 
Upon conviction, the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the custody of the Department of Corrections for not less than 
two (2) nor more than twenty (20) years. 
 
(b)  Aggravated domestic violence; third.  A person is 
guilty of aggravated domestic violence third who, at the 
time of the commission of that offense, commits 
aggravated domestic violence as defined in this 
subsection (4) and who has two (2) prior convictions 
within the past seven (7) years, whether against the same 
or another victim, for any combination of aggravated 
domestic violence under this subsection (4) or simple 
domestic violence third as defined in subsection (3) of this 
section, or substantially similar offenses under the laws of 
another state, of the United States, or of a federally 
recognized Native American tribe. Upon conviction for 
aggravated domestic violence third, the defendant shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten 
(10) nor more than twenty (20) years. 
 
(5)  Sentencing for fourth or subsequent domestic violence offense.  Any 
person who commits an offense defined in subsection (3) or (4) of this 
section, and who, at the time of the commission of that offense, has at least 
three (3) previous convictions, whether against the same or different 
victims, for any combination of offenses defined in subsections (3) and (4) 
of this section or substantially similar offenses under the law of another 
state, of the United States, or of a federally recognized Native American 
tribe, shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 
fifteen (15) years nor more than twenty (20) years. 
 
(6)  In sentencing under subsections (3), (4) and (5) of this section, the court 
shall consider as an aggravating factor whether the crime was committed in 
the physical presence or hearing of a child under sixteen (16) years of age 
who was, at the time of the offense, living within either the residence of the 
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victim, the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence where the offense 
occurred. 
 
(7)  Reasonable discipline of a child, such as spanking, is not an offense 
under subsections (3) and (4) of this section. 
 
(8)  A person convicted under subsection (4) or (5) of this section shall not 
be eligible for parole under the provisions of Section 47-7-3(1)(c) until he 
shall have served one (1) year of his sentence. 
 
(9)  For the purposes of this section: 
 
(a)  “Strangle” means to restrict the flow of oxygen or blood by 
intentionally applying pressure on the neck, throat or chest of 
another person by any means or to intentionally block the nose or 
mouth of another person by any means. 
 
(b)  “Dating relationship” means a social relationship as defined in 
Section 93-21-3. 
 
(10)  Every conviction under subsection (3), (4) or (5) of this section may 
require as a condition of any suspended sentence that the defendant 
participate in counseling or treatment to bring about the cessation of 
domestic abuse. The defendant may be required to pay all or part of the cost 
of the counseling or treatment, in the discretion of the court. 
 
(11)  (a) Upon conviction under subsection (3), (4) or (5) of this section, the 
court shall be empowered to issue a criminal protection order prohibiting 
the defendant from any contact with the victim. The court may include in a 
criminal protection order any other condition available under Section 93-
21-15. The duration of a criminal protection order shall be based upon the 
seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, 
and the continued safety of the victim or another person. However, 
municipal and justice courts may issue criminal protection orders for a 
maximum period of time not to exceed one (1) year. Circuit and county 
courts may issue a criminal protection order for any period of time deemed 
necessary. Upon issuance of a criminal protection order, the clerk of the 
issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi Protection Order 
Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance with no exceptions for 
weekends or holidays, pursuant to Section 93-21-25. 
 
(b)  A criminal protection order shall not be issued against the defendant if 
the victim of the offense, or the victim's lawful representative where the 
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victim is a minor or incompetent person, objects to its issuance, except in 
circumstances where the court, in its discretion, finds that a criminal 
protection order is necessary for the safety and well-being of a victim who 
is a minor child or incompetent adult. 
 
(c)  Criminal protection orders shall be issued on the standardized form 
developed by the Office of the Attorney General and a copy provided to 
both the victim and the defendant. 
 
(d)  It shall be a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a 
criminal protection order. Upon conviction for a violation, the defendant 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($ 
500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) 
months, or both. 
 
(12)  When investigating allegations of a violation of subsection (3), (4), 
(5) or (11) of this section, whether or not an arrest results, law enforcement 
officers shall utilize the form prescribed for such purposes by the Office of 
the Attorney General in consultation with the sheriff’s and police chief's 
associations. However, failure of law enforcement to utilize the uniform 
offense report shall not be a defense to a crime charged under this section. 
The uniform offense report shall not be required if, upon investigation, the 
offense does not involve persons in the relationships specified in 
subsections (3) and (4) of this section. 
 
(13)  In any conviction under subsection (3), (4), (5) or (11) of this section, 
the sentencing order shall include the designation “domestic violence.” The 
court clerk shall enter the disposition of the matter into the corresponding 
uniform offense report. 
 
(14)  Assault upon any of the following listed persons is an aggravating 
circumstance for charging under subsections (1)(b) and (2)(b) of this 
section: 
 
(a)  When acting within the scope of his duty, office or 
employment at the time of the assault: a statewide elected 
official; law enforcement officer; fireman; emergency medical 
personnel; public health personnel; social worker, family 
protection specialist or family protection worker employed by 
the Department of Human Services or another agency; 
Division of Youth Services personnel; any county or municipal 
jail officer; superintendent, principal, teacher or other 
instructional personnel, school attendance officer or school bus 
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driver; any member of the Mississippi National Guard or 
United States Armed Forces; a judge of a circuit, chancery, 
county, justice, municipal or youth court or a judge of the 
Court of Appeals or a justice of the Supreme Court; district 
attorney or legal assistant to a district attorney; county 
prosecutor or municipal prosecutor; court reporter employed 
by a court, court administrator, clerk or deputy clerk of the 
court; public defender; or utility worker; 
 
(b)  A legislator while the Legislature is in regular or 
extraordinary session or while otherwise acting within the 
scope of his duty, office or employment; or 
 
(c)  A person who is sixty-five (65) years of age or older or a 
person who is a vulnerable person, as defined in Section 43-
47-5. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-85. Threats and intimidation; by letter or notice 
 
If any person shall post, mail, deliver, or drop a threatening letter or 
notice to another, whether such other be named or indicated therein 
or not, with intent to terrorize or to intimidate such other, he shall, 
upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not 
more than six months, or by fine not more than five hundred dollars, 
or both. 
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Appendix D 
 
Kidnapping Statutes That Would Be Repealed: 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-1. Abduction for purposes of marriage 
Every person who shall take any person over the age of fourteen (14) years 
unlawfully, against his or her will, and by force, menace, fraud, deceit, 
stratagem or duress, compel or induce him or her to marry such person or 
to marry any other person, or to be defiled, and shall be thereof duly 
convicted, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less 
than five (5) years and not more than fifteen (15) years. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-53. Kidnapping; punishment 
Any person who, without lawful authority and with or without intent to 
secretly confine, shall forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall 
inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be 
confined or imprisoned against his or her will, or without lawful authority 
shall forcibly seize, inveigle or kidnap any vulnerable person as defined in 
Section 43-47-5 or any child under the age of sixteen (16) years against the 
will of the parents or guardian or person having the lawful custody of the 
child, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its 
verdict. If the jury fails to agree on fixing the penalty at imprisonment for 
life, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than one (1) year nor more 
than thirty (30) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. 
This section shall not be held to repeal, modify or amend any other criminal 
statute of this state. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-83. Threats or coercion to prevent lawful 
conduct of business 
If any person shall in any manner threaten with bodily harm, intimidate or 
coerce another person to prevent said person from lawfully trading or 
carrying on business, including buying or selling, he shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not more than one (1) year in the county jail or be fined 
not more than one thousand dollars ($ 1,000.00) or both. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-13. False confinement; sending sane person to 
psychiatric hospital or institution. 
Every person or officer who maliciously sends to or confines in a 
psychiatric hospital or institution or other place, any sane person as a person 
with mental illness, knowing the person to be sane, shall be guilty of a 
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felony, and, on conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five 
Hundred dollars.  
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Appendix E 
 
Sex crimes statutes that would be repealed: 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65. Statutory rape; enhanced penalty for forcible 
sexual intercourse or statutory rape by administering certain substances; 
criminal sexual assault protection order 
 
(1)  The crime of statutory rape is committed when: 
 
(a)  Any person seventeen (17) years of age or older has sexual 
intercourse with a child who: 
 
(i)  Is at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of 
age; 
 
(ii)  Is thirty-six (36) or more months younger than the 
person; and 
 
(iii)  Is not the person's spouse; or 
 
(b)  A person of any age has sexual intercourse with a child who: 
 
(i)  Is under the age of fourteen (14) years; 
 
(ii)  Is twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the 
person; and 
 
(iii)  Is not the person's spouse. 
 
(2)  Neither the victim's consent nor the victim's lack of chastity is a defense 
to a charge of statutory rape. 
 
(3)  Upon conviction for statutory rape, the defendant shall be sentenced as 
follows: 
 
(a)  If eighteen (18) years of age or older, but under twenty-one (21) 
years of age, and convicted under subsection (1) (a) of this section, 
to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years in the State 
Penitentiary or a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($ 
5,000.00), or both; 
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(b)  If twenty-one (21) years of age or older and convicted under 
subsection (1)(a) of this section, to imprisonment of not more than 
thirty (30) years in the State Penitentiary or a fine of not more than 
Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00), or both, for the first offense, 
and not more than forty (40) years in the State Penitentiary for each 
subsequent offense; 
 
(c)  If eighteen (18) years of age or older and convicted under 
subsection (1)(b) of this section, to imprisonment for life in the State 
Penitentiary or such lesser term of imprisonment as the court may 
determine, but not less than twenty (20) years; 
 
(d)  If thirteen (13) years of age or older but under eighteen (18) 
years of age and convicted under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this 
section, such imprisonment, fine or other sentence as the court, in 
its discretion, may determine. 
 
(4)  (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any 
person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible sexual 
intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that person’s consent 
by administering to such person any substance or liquid which shall 
produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to 
prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life 
in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its verdict so prescribes; and in cases 
where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall 
fix the penalty at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the 
court, in its discretion, may determine. 
 
(b)  This subsection (4) shall apply whether the perpetrator is married to the 
victim or not. 
 
(5)  In all cases where a victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years, it shall 
not be necessary to prove penetration where it is shown the genitals, anus 
or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to have 
sexual intercourse with the child. 
 
(6)  (a) Upon conviction under this section, the court may issue a criminal 
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any contact 
with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the victim and 
offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual assault protection 
order any relief available under Section 93-21-15. The term of a criminal 
sexual assault protection order shall be for a time period determined by the 
court, but all orders shall, at a minimum, remain in effect for a period of 
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two (2) years after the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and 
subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release, 
probation, or parole. Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection 
order, the clerk of the issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi 
Protection Order Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance, with 
no exceptions for weekends or holidays as provided in Section 93-21-25, 
and a copy must be provided to both the victim and offender. 
 
(b)  Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the 
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General. 
 
(c)  It is a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a criminal 
sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a violation, the 
defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred 
Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 
six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for the violation of a 
criminal sexual assault protection order shall run consecutively to any other 
sentences imposed on the offender. The court shall also be empowered to 
extend the criminal sexual assault protection order for a period of one (1) 
year for each violation. The incarceration of a person at the time of the 
violation is not a bar to prosecution under this section. Nothing in this 
subsection shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of any other 
penalties or disciplinary action otherwise allowed by law or policy. 
 
(7)  For the purposes of this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean a 
joining of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which the 
penis of the male is inserted into the vagina of the female or the penetration 
of the sexual organs of a male or female human being in which the penis or 
an object is inserted into the genitals, anus or perineum of a male or female. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-68. Rape; procedure for introducing evidence of 
sexual conduct  of complaining witness; “complaining witness” 
defined 
 
(1)  In any prosecution for rape under Section 97-3-65, former 97-3-67 or 
97-3-71, if evidence of sexual conduct of the complaining witness is offered 
to attack the credibility of said complaining witness, the following 
procedure shall be followed: 
 
(a)  A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court 
and prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the 
relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining 
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witness proposed to be presented and its relevancy in attacking the 
credibility of the complaining witness. 
(b)  The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in 
which the offer of proof shall be stated. 
 
(c)  If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court 
shall order a closed hearing in chambers, out of the presence of the 
jury, if any, and at such closed hearing allow the questioning of the 
complaining witness regarding the offer of proof made by the 
defendant. 
 
(d)  At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence 
proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the sexual 
conduct of the complaining witness is relevant and otherwise 
admissible, the court may make an order stating what evidence may 
be introduced by the defendant, and the nature of the questions to 
be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the 
order of the court. 
 
(2)  As used in this section and Section 97-3-70 [Repealed], “complaining 
witness” means the alleged victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of 
which is subject to this section. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69. Rape; “chaste character” presumed; 
uncorroborated testimony of victim insufficient 
In the trial of all cases under the last preceding section, it shall be presumed 
that the female was previously of chaste character, and the burden shall be 
upon the defendant to show that she was not; but no person shall be 
convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the injured female. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-71. Rape; assault with intent to ravish 
Every person who shall be convicted of an assault with intent to forcibly 
ravish any female of previous chaste character shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for such shorter time as may be 
fixed by the jury, or by the court upon the entry of a plea of guilty. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95. Sexual battery 
 
(1)  A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual 
penetration with: 
 
(a)  Another person without his or her consent; 
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(b)  A mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically 
helpless person; 
 
(c)  A child at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of age, 
if the person is thirty-six (36) or more months older than the child; 
or 
 
(d)  A child under the age of fourteen (14) years of age, if the person 
is twenty-four (24) or more months older than the child. 
 
(2)  A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual 
penetration with a child under the age of eighteen (18) years if the person 
is in a position of trust or authority over the child including without 
limitation the child’s teacher, counselor, physician, psychiatrist, 
psychologist, minister, priest, physical therapist, chiropractor, legal 
guardian, parent, stepparent, aunt, uncle, scout leader or coach. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97. Sexual battery; definitions 
For purposes of Sections 97-3-95 through 97-3-103 the following words 
shall have the meaning ascribed herein unless the context otherwise 
requires: 
 
(a)  “Sexual penetration” includes cunnilingus, fellatio, buggery or 
pederasty, any penetration of the genital or anal openings of another 
person's body by any part of a person’s body, and insertion of any 
object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body. 
 
(b)  A “mentally defective person” is one who suffers from a mental 
disease, defect or condition which renders that person temporarily or 
permanently incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his or her 
conduct. 
 
(c)  A “mentally incapacitated person” is one rendered incapable of 
knowing or controlling his or her conduct, or incapable of resisting an 
act due to the influence of any drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or other 
substance administered to that person without his or her consent. 
 
(d)  A “physically helpless person” is one who is unconscious or one 
who for any other reason is physically incapable of communicating an 
unwillingness to engage in an act. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99. Sexual battery; defense of marriage 
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A person is not guilty of any offense under Sections 97-3-95 through 97-3-
103 if the alleged victim is that person’s legal spouse and at the time of the 
alleged offense such person and the alleged victim are not separated and 
living apart; provided, however, that the legal spouse of the alleged victim 
may be found guilty of sexual battery if the legal spouse engaged in forcible 
sexual penetration without the consent of the alleged victim. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-101. Sexual battery; penalty; criminal sexual 
assault protection order 
 
(1)  Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section 
97-3-95(1)(a), (b) or (2) shall be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary for a 
period of not more than thirty (30) years, and for a second or subsequent 
such offense shall be imprisoned in the Penitentiary for not more than forty 
(40) years. 
 
(2)  (a) Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section 
97-3-95(1)(c) who is at least eighteen (18) but under twenty-one (21) years 
of age shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years in the State 
Penitentiary or fined not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($ 5,000.00), or 
both; 
 
(b)  Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section 
97-3-95(1)(c) who is twenty-one (21) years of age or older shall be 
imprisoned not more than thirty (30) years in the State Penitentiary or fined 
not more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00), or both, for the first 
offense, and not more than forty (40) years in the State Penitentiary for each 
subsequent offense. 
 
(3)  Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section 
97-3-95(1)(d) who is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall be imprisoned 
for life in the State Penitentiary or such lesser term of imprisonment as the 
court may determine, but not less than twenty (20) years. 
 
(4)  Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery who is thirteen 
(13) years of age or older but under eighteen (18) years of age shall be 
sentenced to such imprisonment, fine or other sentence as the court, in its 
discretion, may determine. 
 
(5)  (a) Upon conviction under this section, the court may issue a criminal 
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any contact 
with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the victim and 
offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual assault protection 
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order any relief available under Section 93-21-15. The term of a criminal 
sexual assault protection order shall be for a time period determined by the 
court, but all orders shall, at a minimum, remain in effect for a period of 
two (2) years following the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and 
subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release, 
probation, or parole. Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection 
order, the clerk of the issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi 
Protection Order Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance with 
no exceptions for weekends or holidays as provided in Section 93-21-25, 
and a copy must be provided to both the victim and offender. 
 
(b)  Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the 
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General. 
 
(c)  It is a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a criminal 
sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a violation, the 
defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred 
Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 
six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for the violation of a 
criminal sexual assault protection order shall run consecutively to any other 
sentences imposed on the offender. The court may extend the criminal 
sexual assault protection order for a period of one (1) year for each 
violation. The incarceration of a person at the time of the violation is not a 
bar to prosecution under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall be 
construed to prohibit the imposition of any other penalties or disciplinary 
action otherwise allowed by law or policy. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-103. Sexual battery; relationship with other 
criminal statutes 
Sections 97-3-95 through 97-3-103 shall not be held to repeal, modify or 
amend any other criminal statute of this state. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-23. Fondling child; punishment 
 
(1) Any person above the age of eighteen (18) years, who, for the purpose 
of gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved licentious 
sexual desires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or 
her body or any member thereof, or with any object, any child under the 
age of sixteen (16) years, with or without the child's consent, or a mentally 
defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless person as defined 
in Section 97-3-97, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, 
shall be fined in a sum not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) nor 
more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or be committed to the 
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custody of the State Department of Corrections not less than two (2) years 
nor more than fifteen (15) years, or be punished by both such fine and 
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. 
 
(2) Any person above the age of eighteen (18) years, who, for the purpose 
of gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved licentious 
sexual desires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or 
her body or any member thereof, any child younger than himself or herself 
and under the age of eighteen (18) years who is not such person's spouse, 
with or without the child's consent, when the person occupies a position of 
trust or authority over the child shall be guilty of a felony and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or 
be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections not less 
than two (2) years nor more than fifteen (15) years, or be punished by both 
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. A person in a 
position of trust or authority over a child includes without limitation a 
child’s teacher, counselor, physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, minister, 
priest, physical therapist, chiropractor, legal guardian, parent, stepparent, 
aunt, uncle, scout leader or coach. 
(3) Upon a second conviction for an offense under this section or a 
substantially similar offense under the laws of another state, the person so 
convicted shall be punished by commitment to the State Department of 
Corrections for a term not to exceed twenty (20) years. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § § 97-5-41. Carnal knowledge of certain children 
 
(1) Any person who shall have carnal knowledge of his or her unmarried 
stepchild or adopted child younger than himself or herself and over fourteen 
(14) and under eighteen (18) years of age, upon conviction, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten 
(10) years. 
 
(2) Any person who shall have carnal knowledge of an unmarried child 
younger than himself or herself and over fourteen (14) and under eighteen 
(18) years of age, with whose parent he or she is cohabiting or living 
together as husband and wife, upon conviction, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten (10) years. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-31. Indecent exposure 
A person who willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or private parts 
thereof, in any public place, or in any place where others are present, or 
procures another to so expose himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, on 
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conviction for a first offense, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months, 
or both. Upon conviction for a second offense within five (5) years, such 
person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of 
not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or shall be imprisoned 
not exceeding one (1) year, or both. Upon conviction of a third or 
subsequent offense within five (5) years, such person shall be guilty of a 
felony and shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000.00) or shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years 
in the State Penitentiary, or both. It is not a violation of this statute for a 
woman to breast-feed. 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-11. Disturbance by abusive language or indecent 
exposure 
 
Any person who enters the dwelling house of another, or the yard or 
curtilage thereof, or upon the public highway, or any other place near such 
premises, and in the presence or hearing of the family or the possessor or 
occupant thereof, or of any member thereof, makes use of abusive, profane, 
vulgar or indecent language, or is guilty of any indecent exposure of his or 
her person at such place, shall be punished for a misdemeanor. The act of 
breast-feeding shall not constitute indecent exposure. 
